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his EAP completes 29 years of 
publication and includes “items 
of interest” and “citations re-
ceived.” Two important books 
dealing with the phenomenology of place 
have recently been published, and we high-
light their front covers, below, and feature 
additional information in “book notes.”  
The first volume is a 2nd edition of phi-
losopher Jeff Malpas’ groundbreaking 
Place and Experience: A Philosophical 
Topography, originally published in 1999. 
This expanded version includes a new 
chapter on place and technological moder-
nity, “especially the seeming loss of place 
in the contemporary world.” 
The second book note describes EAP ed-
itor David Seamon’s Life Takes Place: 
Phenomenology, Lifeworlds and Place 
Making, which argues that, “even in our 
mobile, hypermodern world, human life is 
impossible without place.” Seamon gives 
particular attention to the generative as-
pects of place and locates six place pro-
cesses that he identifies as place interac-
tion, place identity, place release, place re-
alization, place intensification, and place 
creation. 
This issue of EAP includes two essays, 
the first by the late philosopher and science 
educator Henri Bortoft, who focuses on 
ways of thinking holistically, including the 
conceptual efforts of proto-phenomenolo-
gist Johann Wolfgang von Goethe; phys-
icists Niels Bohr and David Bohm; and 
philosophers J. G. Bennett, Edmund 
Husserl, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
The second entry is by retired environ-
mental educator John Cameron, who be-
gins a new series of essays on the lived re-
lationship between interiority and exterior-
ity, particularly as qualities of the natural 
world and place contribute to that relation-
ship. EAP readers will remember Cam-
eron’s earlier set of essays, “Letters from 
Far South,” that focused on his homestead-
ing experience on Bruny Island, Tasmania. 
Items of interest 
A summer seminar intensive, “Let the Phe-
nomena Speak!” is sponsored by upstate 
New York’s Nature Institute, June 24–
28, 2018. Participants will engage in care-
ful observation and accurate description of 
natural phenomena via first-person, expe-
riential encounter grounded in the phe-
nomenological science of Goethe. http://na-
tureinstitute.org/. 
 
The Portland Urban Architecture Re-
search Lab (PURAL) is sponsoring their 
annual conference on the work of architect 
Christopher Alexander, best known for 
his influential book, Pattern Language. To 
be held in Portland, Oregon, October 24–
28, 2018, this year’s conference theme is 
“Migration, Refugees, and Patterns.” EAP 
editor David Seamon is a keynote speaker 
and will present “Ways of Understanding 
Wholeness: Christopher Alexander’s 
Work as Synergistic Relationality.” 
 
The peer-reviewed Ecopsychology fo-
cuses on the links between human health, 
culture, and the health of the planet. The 
journal “seeks to reshape modern psychol-
ogy by showing that it cannot stand apart 
from an intimate human connection with 
the natural environment. We need that 
connection with nature to do well mentally 
and physically, let alone to flourish, as in-
dividuals and as a species.” 
The journal will publish a special issue 
on “Children and Nature,” co-edited by 
Judy Braus, executive director of the 
North American Association of Environ-
mental Education; and Sarah Milligan 
Toffler, executive director of the Children 
and Nature Network. The editors are inter-
ested in both empirical and theoretical pa-










Ian Angus, 2018. Crisis, Biol-
ogy, Ecology: A New Starting 
Point for Phenomenology? 
Journal of the British Society 
for Phenomenology, vol. 49, 
pp. 1-13. 
 
This philosopher explains that, particularly 
in his 1935 The Crisis of the European Sci-
ences and Transcendental Phenomenol-
ogy, Edmund Husserl focused “on a cri-
tique of the formal-mathematical paradigm 
of the physical science of nature” and sug-
gested “the possibility of biology as the ex-
emplary science” rather than physics. An-
gus argues that the science of ecology 
might be a more comprehensive starting 
point for Husserl’s “radical inquiry into the 
grounding of the idea of science.” For An-
gus’s justification of this claim, see the 
sidebar, below. 
 
Biology, ecology, and lifeworlds 
[I]f biology is concerned with the spec-
ificity of… life-forms and their worlds, 
then it does not seem to adequately 
capture the interaction between these 
life-forms and worlds that constitutes 
the “life” of the lifeworld. Scientific 
ecology began with precisely this dis-
tinction between biology as a morpho-
logical science of characteristics of 
species considered independently and 
ecology as a science of the interaction 
between species and non-living 
forms…. 
    The set of relationships within a 
pragmatically delimited place consti-
tutes a whole through achieving a cer-
tain balance between its interacting 
parts. It is this concept of balance 
which most clearly adds to the biologi-
cal concept of life to which Husserl re-
verted in seeking a concept of scien-
tific striving not bound to the exem-
plary role of mathematical physics…. 
    Speaking teleologically, we may say 
that the concept of an ecosystem is a 
way of conceptualizing the Whole that 
is the universe of all that is through re-
lationships of dependence and mainte-
nance by the community of all beings. 
Humans, as one species of these be-
ings, depend upon this Whole. A par-
ticular grouping of humans, humans 
within a larger community of beings in 
a given place circumscribed by an elas-
tic boundary, develop the specifics of 
their culture in relation to the specifics 
of the local ecology…. 
    Indeed, insofar as humans are de-
pendent on the ecology of their life, 
and, as Husserl asserted, humans un-
derstand other life-forms by analogical 
transfer from their own sense of life, 
human understanding of the sustaining 
balance of other life-forms seems to be 
essential to the meaning of humans 
themselves and to thereby confer a 
sense of intrinsic worth on that ecol-
ogy. 
    Ecology as a limited but encompass-
ing science stands at the threshold of a 
reconsideration of, not only embodied 
subjectivity, but also worth and ethics 
insofar as humans are dependent on it. 
It would thus appear to have a greater 
claim than biology to being a science 
of continuity with lifeworld experi-
ence. It would therefore not only be 
crisis-free but would motivate concep-
tual abstractions that aim at scientific 
understanding of living relationships 
(I. Angus, p. 9, p. 11).  
 
 
Elizabeth A. Behnke, 2018. 
Phenomenological Reflec-
tions on the Structure of 
Transformation: The Example 
of Sustainable Agriculture. 
Filosofija Sociologia, vol. 29, 
no. 1, pp. 21-31. 
 
This phenomenologist writes that the pur-
pose of this paper is twofold: “First, I want 
to suggest that the very practice of phe-
nomenology itself includes transformative 
elements, prefiguring a possible kinship 
between phenomenologists and environ-
mental advocates or other proponents of 
cultural change. But I also want to take 
some preliminary steps toward a phenom-
enological analysis of a topic in which is-
sues of both the ‘natural’ and the ‘cultural’ 
environment are woven into a single (and 
sometimes fragile) fabric: namely, the food 
we eat. This in turn will entail some inves-
tigation into certain parallels between the 
constitution of the ‘physicalistic thing’ in 
the objective natural-scientific attitude and 
the constitution of the ‘commodity’ in the 
commercial corporate attitude…. In this 
way, I hope to present phenomenology as 
a living tradition with much to contribute 
to our current crises and challenges—and 
to the cultural transformations they call 
for” (p. 21). See the sidebar, below. 
 
 
Mundane and transcendental 
phenomenologies 
[One can identify] two main ap-
proaches through which phenomenol-
ogy can recognize and honor values 
beyond those of the commercial corpo-
rate attitude: namely, mundane phe-
nomenology (lifeworldly phenomenol-
ogy, phenomenological psychology) 
and transcendental phenomenology. 
    The former is typically reached by 
placing scientific knowledge in brack-
ets and returning to the world of pre-
scientific experience, a move for which 
Husserl often uses the term Rückgang 
(going back); the latter, for which Hus-
serl often uses the term Rückfrage 
(asking back), takes the phenomena—
and their horizons—as clues (Leit-
faden) from which to inquire back into 
the corelative attitudes, assumptions, 
interest, achievements, and essential 
styles of constituting (inter)subjective 
life. Following the latter path would 
accordingly require, for instance, more 
detailed analyses of the ways in which 
the world is constituted for such domi-
nant knowledge systems as the corpo-
rate mentality through such categories 
as consumers, commodities, and prof-
its…. 
    On the other hand, we must also 
continue to (re)establish the legitimacy 
of situated lifeworldly experience and 
its values; here the accent lies on fur-
ther description of patterns of lived 
meanings, just as they are experienced 
in the natural attitude, within the sub-
ject-relative contexts we study. Such 
work is particularly crucial to save en-
dangered local knowledge systems, 
and thereby to foster a biodemocracy 
in which both biodiversity and the di-
verse communities that ultimately sus-
tain it can be restored to health and 
wholeness. 
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    These, then are at least two of the 
main ways in which phenomenology 
offers us the possibility of a new scien-
tificity that can provide the intersubjec-
tive verifiability we require while pre-
serving not only the subject-relatedness 
that makes our earth a surrounding 
world or “environment” (Umwelt) in 
the first place, but also the situated 
world-relatedness that makes us hu-
man. 
    It is true that phenomenological in-
vestigation might not, in and of itself, 
feed a starving person, or renew de-
pleted soil, or restore the pollinators 
killed by pesticide, or heal the air and 
the water of a wounded planet, or halt 
the globalization of the corporate men-
tality. Like a seed, however, the re-
trieval and rehabilitation of the experi-
ential dimension is capable of unfurl-
ing into something beyond itself, im-
plying a world in which it can truly 
flourish. 
    Thus for me, the task of phenome-
nology in a time of political crisis, cul-
tural change, and environmental chal-
lenges is not only to clarify our predic-
aments, but also to contribute—in 
whatever way possible—to transform-
ing our traditions in ever more fruitful 




Jelena Bogdanović, ed., 2018. 
Perceptions of the Body and 
Sacred Space in Late Antiq-
uity and Byzantium. London: 
Routledge. 
 
The nine chapters of this edited collection 
consider “the Christian understanding of 
the body and sacred space in the medieval 
Mediterranean.” The chapters are orga-
nized in three parts: “the immaterial and 
placeless sacred”; “the sacred made palpa-
ble”; and “the sacred delivered.” The edi-
tor’s aim is “a better understanding of the 
corporeality of sacred art and architec-
ture.” See the sidebar, above right, which 
is a section from the editor’s introduction 





The sacred and corporeality 
[In current research on the sacred and 
its corporeality, there is a scholarly 
split] in the very definition of the sa-
cred and how the sacred related to the 
forces (agents) that mediate the sacred 
and the capacity (agency) of the sacred 
to act in a given locale…. 
    [F]or some researchers, the sacred is 
a constructed sociopolitical discourse 
amongst humans as agents, recurrently 
studied as cohesive, idealized groups 
as mediatory forces that allow us to ad-
dress the agency of the sacred through 
the contextualized materials world. 
Other scholars align with teleological 
views, looking at the final causes, de-
sign, and purpose in the abstract, 
wherein the material world is acting as 
an agent and is mediating the ideal, di-
vine agency. 
    In each case, human agency and the 
locale of the sacred remain present in 
these scholarly debates. Human agency 
is examined either through the human 
body most literally understood or 
through various material objects that 
reflect the embodiment of human en-
counters with the holy, while the locale 
of the sacred is habitually examined 
through various material forms of 
framing the sacred space (J. Bogda-
nović, p. 2). 
 
 
Christine Varga-Harris, 2015. 
Stories of House and 
Home: Soviet Apart-
ment Life during the 
Khrushchev Years. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Univ. Press. 
 
This historian offers a “social 
and cultural history of the 
massive construction cam-
paign that Khrushchev insti-
tuted in 1957 to resolve the 
housing crisis in the Soviet 
Union and to provide each 
family its own apartment. 
Drawing on archival materi-
als, as well as memoirs, fic-
tion, and the Soviet press, 
Varga-Harris shows how the 
many aspects of this enormous state initia-
tive—from neighborhood planning to inte-
rior design—sought to alleviate crowded, 
undignified living conditions and sculpt 
residents into ideal Soviet citizens.” 
Khrushchev aimed for a separate-apart-
ment arrangement that marked a major 
shift in living space from communal to one 
family-dwelling, such as the unit illus-
trated in the plan below, which was de-
signed for a nuclear family of three (upper 
right, bath; lower right, kitchen; left, the 
main “common room,” marked out into 
“zones” for leisure, study, and sleep).  
 
Stephanie Meeks with Kevin 
C. Murphy, 2016. The Past 
and Future City: How Historic 
Preservation is Reviving 
America’s Communities. 
Washington, DC: Island 
Press. 
 
This book argues that “the preservation of 
historic buildings and places is essential in 
the present and future world of urban plan-
ning,” with a focus on the United States. 
One central question asked by Meeks is 
“what makes a building loved?” The au-
thor argues that “historic preservation is 
not only important for the emotional sake 
of humans, but that it can and should play 
a significant role to ensure a more sustain-
able and environmentally friendly future 
for our planet.” 
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Derek J. Paulsen, 2013. Crime 
and Planning: Building So-
cially Sustainable Communi-
ties. NY: Planners Press/CRC 
Press/Taylor & Francis. 
 
This criminologist argues that “the form 
and layout of a built environment has a sig-
nificant influence on crime by creating op-
portunities for it and, in turn, shaping com-
munity crime patterns.” Topics discussed 
include “connectivity, mixed-use develop-
ments, land use and zoning, transit-ori-
ented design, and pedestrian trails, green-
ways, and parks.” Includes a discussion of 
what Paulsen identifies as the two main de-
sign approaches to prevent crime: what he 
calls “connectivity” (including space syn-
tax) vs. “enclosure” (including Oscar New-
man’s defensible space). 
 
Martino Stierli, 2013. Las Ve-
gas in the Rearview Mirror: 
The City in Theory, Photog-
raphy, and Film. Malibu, CA: 
Getty Research Institute. 
 
This Swiss art historian uses Las Vegas as 
a case study to examine American megaci-
ties and urban sprawl. Drawing particu-
larly on Venturi, Scott Brown and 
Izenour’s 1972 Learning from Las Vegas, 
Stierli considers “the way architectural 
theories of modernism and postmodernism 
were questioned in a context of radical and 
rapid social change…. [He envisions] a 
methodology for understanding the… im-
pact of signs in the urban context of meg-
acities.” Includes discussion of Gordon 
Cullen, Kevin Lynch, Donald Appleyard, 
Phil Thiel, and Peter Blake.  
 
Julian Thomas, 2006. Phe-
nomenology and Material 
Culture, in Handbook of Ma-
terial Culture, Christopher Til-
ley, Webb Keane, Susanne 
Küchler, Michael Rowlands, 
and Patricia Spyer, eds. Lon-
don: Sage, pp. 43-59. 
 
This anthropologist argues that “the ideas 
of the phenomenological tradition have 
been highly influential in the study of ma-
terial culture, although their source has not 
always been explicitly acknowledged.” 
Thomas reviews the phenomenological 
perspectives of Husserl, Heidegger, Mer-
leau-Ponty, and Levinas; he then discusses 
work in the human and social sciences that 
have drawn on phenomenological themes 
to better understand aspects of material 
culture, particularly buildings, places, and 
landscapes. 
He uses an essay by anthropologist Tim 
Ingold on basket weaving to illustrate the 
process of human making: “weaving is… a 
paradigm of what human beings do when 
they create artefacts, a skillful crafting that 
knits things together” (p. 54). The sidebar, 
below and right, is reproduced from 
Thomas’s conclusion. 
 
An interrogation of the everyday 
Phenomenology developed out of an 
imperative to secure Western science 
by ascertaining the precise relationship 
between consciousness and the mate-
rial world…. 
    Since the scientific revolution of the 
17th century, Western thought had re-
lied on the notion that science had 
privileged access to the fundamental 
nature of the universe. Husserl had im-
plicitly claimed that phenomenology 
was concerned with an order of reality 
that was more primordial than that ad-
dressed by the natural sciences. 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, by ar-
guing that our most basic understand-
ings can only be generated in the con-
text of a social and phenomenal world, 
transformed phenomenology from a 
search for abstract essences to an inter-
rogation of the everyday. 
    This shift from the transcendental to 
the immanent can be understood as 
part of a more general 20th-century 
trend, which acknowledges the im-
portance of ordinary life. In turn, we 
could identify the emergence of mate-
rial culture studies with this growing 
interest in the quotidian. 
    What distinguishes phenomenology, 
however, is a desire to see the every-
day as an appropriate location for at-
tending to the deepest of existential 
questions. A mediation on a discarded 
shoe [Heidegger] can lead into a ques-
tioning of the nature of art, and so on. 
This is because the tradition refuses to 
separate philosophical knowledge from 
the world of things, while viewing 
thinking as an embodied practice, and 
sees no observation, however, mun-
dane, as immune from an unending cri-
tique. Phenomenology consequentially 
has an invaluable contribution to make 
to the investigation of material culture, 
but it must do this without relinquish-
ing its critical spirit. 
    More precisely, it is clear that the 
full potential of phenomenological ap-
proaches to material culture is far from 
having been realized. While experien-
tial analyses of architecture and land-
scape in present and past contexts have 
been undertaken, these have often con-
centrated on the visual and (to a lesser 
extent) the tactile aspects of human en-
gagements with space and place…. 
    By comparison, portable artefacts 
have been less intensively studied from 
a phenomenological standpoint than 
places and structures. Ingold’s account 
of basket weaving opens the way for 
new approaches to a variety of forms 
of “making”…. Moving beyond the 
conventional focus on production and 
consumption [in archeology], an inves-
tigation of the haptic qualities of ob-
jects might prove productive, particu-
larly in the context of the mass-pro-
duced material culture of the contem-
porary West, where the impact of phe-
nomenological thought has been slim. 
    Finally, a keystone of the phenome-
nological approach is the understand-
ing that the “subjective” aspects of ex-
perience are not superficial elements 
constructed on the bedrock of an invar-
iant materiality, but are the means 
through which the material world re-
veals itself to us. It might therefore be 
instructive to consider the question of 
the variable ways in which the (pre-
sumably culturally constructed) moods, 
attunements and emotional states of 
people in a variety of contexts disclose 
their material surroundings and condi-
















Jeff Malpas, 2018. Place and Experience, A Philosophical Topography, 2nd edition. London: 
Routledge [1st edition published in 1999 by Cambridge University Press]. 
 
hen the first edition of phi-
losopher Jeff Malpas’  
Place and Experience was 
published in 1999, it 
marked a major advance in place thinking 
begun with philosopher Edward Casey’s 
Getting back into Place, published in 
1993. Both thinkers argued that place and 
lived emplacement are an integral part of 
who and what we are as human beings As 
Casey writes in his thoughtful forward to 
the new edition of Malpas’s book: 
 
It is notable that Malpas is not so much 
interested in “place as experienced” as in 
“place as a structure within which expe-
rience (as well as action, thought, and 
judgment) is possible” [Malpas 2018, p. 
179]. This structure is not a formal a pri-
ori of experience but rather what we call 
a material condition of that experience in 
its many forms. As such, it is requisite for 
that experience: “such placedness is a 
necessary condition of our very capacity 
to experience” [Malpas, 2018, p. 194]…. 
…For places are places for experiences 
of every actual or imaginable sort. Con-
versely, experiences are nothing if not 
emplaced: without a place in which to be 
present and to be situated, an experience 
would evaporate into think air—thus 
would not be the experience of an experi-
encer, a sensing or thinking or feeling 
subject, and thus no experience at all. 
With the phrase “place and experi-
ence,” we are not talking of a tautology 
here but of a profound identity, or better, 
of what Plato called an “indefinite dyad,” 
in which each term is essential to the 
other even if the terms of the relationship 
may not be objectively discernable (p. xi, xii). 
 
One of the most important questions 
Malpas probes in this new edition of 
Place and Experience is how, in our hy-
permodern, globalized world, do we find 
ways to relocate ourselves in a lived em-
placement that we can never as human be-
ings escape or set aside? He writes: 
“Place must persist even in the face of the 
apparent loss of place.” 
Though its argument is difficult and re-
quires much concentration to master, this 
book—like Casey’s Getting back into 
Place—radically reconfigures our con-
ceptual and lived understanding of how 
we experience, know, and act in the 
world. The following sidebars include 
three passages from the book and some of 
Malpas’s depictions of place-as-concept. 
 
Descriptions of  
place-as-concept 
“Place is understood as an open re-
gion within which a variety of ele-
ments are brought to light through 
their mutual inter-relation and juxta-
position within that region….” (p. 15). 
 
“a bounded openness or opening….” 
(p. 26) 
 
“The crucial point about the connec-
tion between place and experience is 
not, however, that place is properly 
something only encountered ‘in’ ex-
perience, but rather that place is inte-
gral to the very structure and possi-
bility of experience” (p. 31). 
 
“fundamental to the idea of place is 
the idea of an open and yet bounded 
realm within which the things of the 
world can appear and events can ‘take 
place’” (p. 33). 
 
“Place is that bounded open region of 
possibility in which even space and 
time, as well as subjectivity and ob-
jectivity, first emerge. As such a re-
gion, it is fundamentally relational, 
and that relationality permeates every-
thing that pertains to place, everything 
that belongs with it, everything that 
appears in its embrace. 
    “It might even be said that it is the 
relationality of place that underpins 
the idea of the essential human con-
nection to place, since that connection 
is itself a specific mode of the broader 
relationality that characterizes place 
as such, and so also characterizes 
what is in place” (p. 40). 
 
Only within the framework of 
place 
The idea of place encompasses both 
the idea of the social activities and the 
institutions that are expressed in and 
through the structure of a particular 
place… and the idea of the physical 
objects and events in the world… that 
constrain and are sometimes con-
strained by those social activities and 
institutions. 
    There is no doubt that the ordering 
of a particular place… is not inde-
pendent of social ordering… how-
ever, this does not legitimate the 
claim that place, space, or time are 
merely social constructions. Indeed, 
the social does not exist prior to place, 
nor is it given expression except in 









and so the social cannot be that out of 
which, or solely by means of which, 
place is “constructed.” It is within the 
structure of place that the very possi-
bility of the social arises. 
    In grasping the structure of place at 
issue here what is grasped is an open 
and interconnected region within 
which other persons, things, spaces, 
and abstract locations, and even one’s 
self can appear, be recognized, identi-
fied, and interacted with. 
    But in ‘grasping’ such a region, it is 
not a matter of the subject grasping 
something of which the acting, expe-
riencing creature is independent. A re-
gion or place does not simply stand 
ready for the gaze of some observing 
subject. Instead, it encompasses the 
experiencing creature itself, and so 
the structure of subjectivity is given in 
and through the structure of place. 
    Something similar might be said of 
the idea of objectivity, at least in the 
sense that objectivity is understood, 
not merely as consisting in the exist-
ence of some physical entity or sys-
tem, but as precisely that which can 
be present to a subject. In this respect, 
the idea of the object is something es-
tablished only within a place, and 
thereby in relation to a subject—    
although, in saying this, it must be re-
membered that both subject and ob-
ject are thereby “placed” within the 
same structure, rather than one or the 
other being the underlying ground for 
that structure. 
    Of course, the existence of some 
particular place… will be causally de-
pendent on a set of physical processes 
and structures, but this does not mean 
that place can be simply reduced to 
such processes or structures. The lan-
guage of place, of self and other, of 
subject and object, describes the 
world in a way that is tied to the pos-
sibility of agency and attitude, not in 
terms of physical process alone. 
    Indeed, while the existence of a 
place may be causally dependent on 
certain physical processes, the capac-
ity to describe, experience, and under-
stand those processes is, in turn, pos-
sible only within the framework of 
place (J. Malpas, pp. 34–35). 
Within the embrace of place 
Given that the fundamental structure 
of place and the relation to it cannot 
be treated as anything other than a 
necessary structure, the basic struc-
ture of place and the relation to place 
must indeed remain much the same 
now as it has been in the past. That 
this is so is reinforced by considera-
tion of the fact that the apparent loss 
of place, to which [geographer Ed-
ward] Relph and others draw atten-
tion, is something that itself occurs 
topologically, which is to say that it 
occurs in and through the experience 
of places. That it should be so is, of 
course, just what one would expect 
given the necessity just alluded to. 
    If we distinguish between, on the 
one hand, place as a general and en-
compassing structure—the complex 
bounded and interwoven structure of 
spatiality and temporality—and, on 
the other hand, place as it refers to in-
dividual places, each of which has its 
own character…, then it is easy to see 
how place must persist, even in the 
face of the apparent loss of place. 
    Places can be objects of experi-
ence—as I experience this place or 
that place—but place is also that 
within and out of which experience 
arises. Any experience of the world, 
along with the appearing of things 
within the world, will thus always be 
from within the embrace of place. 
    What is described as the loss of 
place is therefore more properly de-
scribed as an experience of place in 
which place is seemingly effaced in 
its very presentation. I find myself 
here, and yet, in being here, I find 
nothing that marks off this place as 
distinctive—that marks it off as just 
the place that it is. 
     Consider this example, which will 
be familiar to many: except for differ-
ences in the clothing and ethnicity of 
the shoppers, being in a shopping 
mall in Beijing may be almost indis-
tinguishable from being in a shopping 
mall in Sydney, from being in a shop-
ping mall in Dubai, from being in a 
shopping mall in Houston—the same 
shops, the same products, the same ar-
chitecture. Here is the experience of 
being in a place that nevertheless also 
appears in such a way that it obscures 
its very character as a place, and, so, 
one can say that the experience is al-
most like being nowhere at all…. (J. 
Malpas, pp. 202–03). 
 
Losing and regaining place 
The way in which the sense of the 
loss of self may be tied to a sense of 
the loss of place, and the regaining of 
self to a regaining of place, was a cen-
tral theme in the last chapter [chapter 
8]. Consideration of the topographic 
and spatial effects of modern technol-
ogy on action and the self merely re-
inforces that basic point. Taking up 
new technologies is not like donning a 
new set of clothes—as if the technol-
ogy were something completely exter-
nal that could be put on or off at will, 
without making any real difference to 
the body (or the self) beneath. 
    Technologies change us through 
changing the material forms in which 
our lives are embodied and ex-
pressed—through changing the ways 
in which space, time, and place are 
experienced and appear. This point 
has significant implications, not just 
for the consideration of modernity or 
the technologies that reign within it, 
but also for all manner of human life 
and activity. 
    When we act, we act in ways that 
are both shaped by and also, to some 
extent, shaping of the specific charac-
ter of the places, times, and spaces in 
which we are embodied and located... 
    The ways in which we shape places 
thus have a direct effect on the shapes 
of our very lives and the lives of those 
around us. This has special signifi-
cance for… practices such as architec-
ture, landscape design, urban and re-
gional planning, interior design, and 
even furniture and fashion design. 
    In as much as those practices deal 
directly with the place, time, and 
space of things, which are the very 
materiality of things, they shape the 
things themselves, and so shape the 
possibilities that are made available 
for human life. To design and build a 
house, to construct a garden or plan a 
town, to craft a chair or sew a gown, 
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is also to touch on the shape of action, 
the form of experience, the contour of 
thought. 
    Yet even when the spatial and topo-
graphic are not directly or explicitly 
thematised in some practice, place is 
no less relevant or influential. Any 
and every action, any and every inter-
vention in the world, is always placed 
and thereby affected by place as well 
as affecting place. So, too, place is al-
ways affecting of human being, even 
if only the being of the one who acts. 
Place is the very medium of our lives; 
that which supports us, that within 
which we encounter one another, and 
that which gives us space in which to 
move and time for such movement. 
    The fundamental role played by 
place is indeed unchanged by technol-
ogy (because, as already noted, tech-
nology depends on place and our rela-
tion to place in order to function, even 
as it also obscures place). Yet,        
although limited in this way, the 
changes wrought by modern technol-
ogy in respect of place, and so of 
space and time, remain quite radical 
and far-reaching. One of those 
changes is… the way different places 
are entangled together in the same 
places. Another is the frequently 
noted phenomenon of time-space 
compression, originally advanced by 
geographer David Harvey and taken 
up by others since….  
    Given the way in which the rise of 
modern science, as well as modern 
technology, has been closely tied to 
the rise of the idea of space as pure 
extension…, one can view modernity, 
in general, as determined by that very 
same mode of spatiality. The sup-
posed ‘placelessness’ of the modern 
world can thus be seen as a reflection 
of the dominance of an almost purely 
spatialised view…that is based not in 
any subjective mode of spatiality but, 
rather, in the levelled-out spatiality 
that belongs with objectivity. 
    To the extent that place itself is al-
lowed to appear in that view, it is as a 
mere location within such an objec-
tive spatiality. Thus, within the struc-
tures of contemporary capitalism, 
within modern financial and manage-
rial frameworks, within the digital 
media and communications networks 
of today, appear no genuine ‘places’, 
but only the representation of un-
bounded spaces containing nodes, 
lines, and flows… [T]his mode of 
spatiality is dominant in the writing 
and thinking even among those who 
attempt to theorize and critique the 
structures of modernity. 
    Not only are there those who valor-
ise this mode of spatiality, but, even 
where it is the object of critique, the 
assumption that this mode of spatial-
ity is inevitable and ubiquitous in con-
temporary life means that there is no 
real basis on which any genuine cri-
tique can be based. If the modern 
world is indeed a “space of flows” (to 
use Manuel Castells’ phrase), then 
that is just what it is, and we must ac-
commodate ourselves to it. If it results 
in a change to the character of human 
experience, then that is simply the 
way things are, and, once again, we 
can only accommodate ourselves to 
that change. 
    The possibility of real critique de-
pends, in fact, on recognising the way 
in which the mode of spatiality, 
through which modern technological 
capitalism articulates and presents it-
self, is indeed inconsistent with the 
properly placed character not only of 
human being but of all experience and 
all appearing—even, if we attend 
closely enough, the appearing of mod-
ern technological capitalism. Critique, 
in this instance, depends on revealing 
the way the modern spatialisation of 
the world hides the topographical 
character of the world, as well as the 
topography in which that spatialisa-
tion is itself embedded. 
    What the consideration of techno-
logical modernity demonstrates, in 
spite of its own contrary self-repre-
sentation (since the rhetoric of moder-
nity is so often about precisely the es-
cape from place), is indeed the neces-
sity of place for all appearance, and so 
also the way the world itself opens up 
only in and through place. 
    And it is not just one unique place 
that is at issue here—“The centre 
starts from everywhere,” writes [poet] 
Kenneth White, and so, too, does the 
world have its beginning in any and 
every place, even though the exact 
way this occurs may be different in 
different places. Just as the horizon of 
the visual field is not that which pre-
vents vision but precisely that which 
enables it—the abolition of the hori-
zon being the erasure of vision rather 
than its freeing-up—so place and be-
ing-placed is that which enables the 
opening up of the entirety of the 
world. Thus, the essential bounded-
ness of place allows the entry into the 
unboundedness of the world. 
    In this way, too, place appears as 
the first and most primordial form of 
liminality, the latter term deriving 
from the Latin for threshold, limen, 
and connecting with the Latin limitem 
or limes, meaning limit or bound; and 
place appears as essentially adventual, 
as in ‘arrival’, ‘event’, ‘happening’, 
or, more literally, a ‘coming to’. To 
be in place is therefore to be at the 
threshold of the world and to be taken 
up in the happening of world. 
    The relation between place and 
world, between limit and openness, 
limit and opening, is frequently over-
looked or misconstrued—whether be-
cause of the obscuring effects of tech-
nology or as a result our own ten-
dency to introverted obsession with 
ourselves. Yet even though places 
may seem to change, place as such re-
mains, and so too does the essential 
relation of place and the human. 
    The world begins in place, but so 














David Seamon, 2018. Life Takes Place: Phenomenology, Lifeworlds and Place Making. Lon-
don: Routledge. 
 
n Life Takes Place environment-be-
havior researcher and EAP editor 
David Seamon argues that, even in 
our mobile, hypermodern world, hu-
man life is impossible without place. Sea-
mon draws on examples of specific places 
and place experiences to understand place 
and lived emplacement more broadly. 
Advocating for a holistic way of under-
standing that he calls synergistic relation-
ality, he defines places as spatial fields 
that gather, activate, sustain, identify, and 
interconnect things, human beings, expe-
riences, meanings, and events. 
As a hook to focus his argument, Sea-
mon draws on the colloquial expression, 
“Life takes place,” and what it might 
mean experientially, existentially, and 
phenomenologically. Why does life 
“take” place? Does “take” mean “re-
quires” as in the phrases “learning takes 
effort” or “healing takes time”? What 
could it mean that life requires place? In 
today’s hypermodern times, does the 
phrase even make sense as human life so 
often involves autonomous individuals 
making their way in worlds independent 
of any environments or places in which 
those individuals find themselves? 
Recognizing that places change over 
time, Seamon examines their processual 
dimension by identifying six generative 
processes that he labels place interaction, 
place identity, place release, place reali-
zation, place intensification, and place 
creation. Drawing on practical examples 
from architecture, planning, and urban 
design, he argues that an understanding of 
these six place processes might contribute 
to a more rigorous place making that pro-
duces robust places and propels vibrant 
environmental experiences. 
In the sidebars below are reproduced 
Seamon’s introduction to a synergistic 
approach to place and his description of 
one of the place processes—place re-
lease, which most broadly refers to envi-
ronmental serendipity and happenstance. 
The third sidebar relates to the lived syn-
ergy among the six processes, which are 
summarized, in both their sustaining and 
undermining modes, in the table on p. 10. 
 
Place as synergistic 
relationality 
To provide a conceptual starting point 
for the phenomenology of place I de-
velop here, I identify two contrasting 
conceptual understandings of place—
what I call analytic relationality and 
synergistic relationality. In analytic 
relationality, place is understood as a 
collection of parts among which are 
arbitrarily identified a series of link-
ages then measured and correlated to 
demonstrate stronger and weaker con-
nections and relationships. This mode 
of understanding informs much cur-
rent place research, mostly in a tacit, 
unquestioned way. 
    In contrast, an understanding of 
place grounded in synergistic relation-
ality assumes a phenomenological 
perspective and works to interpret 
place as an integrated, generative field 
that shapes and is shaped by parts in-
tegrally interconnected in a physical 
and experiential whole. The parts are 
only parts as they sustain and are sus-
tained by the constitution of the 
whole…. 
    Articulating this inseparable inter-
connectedness is hugely difficult be-
cause place as a whole must be under-
stood to know its parts, yet those parts 
must be understood to know the 
whole of place. In this book, I argue 
that the perspective of synergistic re-
lationality contributes to an under-
standing of place that is more accu-
rate, comprehensive, and usable than 
an understanding grounded in analytic 
relationality….  
    The difficult conceptual and practi-
cal matter, however, is how places are 
to be looked at and understood via 
synergistic relationality. If this ap-
proach to wholeness offers a more 
comprehensive, processual rendition 
of place, how is this knowledge to be 
looked for and discerned? How, onto-
logically and epistemologically, is 
place to be understood synergisti-
cally? These are the central questions 
I address in this book (D. Seamon, pp. 
21–22, p. 27). 
 
Place release 
Place release involves an environmen-
tal serendipity of unexpected encoun-
ters and events. In everyday language, 
these moments of happenstance are 
described by such words and phrases 
as “surprising,” “accidental,” “seem-
ingly random,” or “without clear 
cause.” English incorporates a good 
number of colloquial expressions for 
these serendipitous events, including 
“out of the blue,” “from left field,” 
“without warning,” “all of a sudden,” 
“not bargained for,” and “not in the 
cards.” 
    Proceeding phenomenologically, I 
am largely concerned here with expli-
cating some of the lived features of 
these unusual, unexpected moments. 
I 
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Real-world examples of place release 
are meeting an old friend accidently 
on the sidewalk; enjoying the extem-
poraneous performance of an itinerant 
street musician; or becoming friendly 
with, dating, and eventually marrying 
the checkout clerk who just happened 
to take your take-out lunch order each 
work day…. 
    [P]lace release contributes, in 
smaller and larger measure, to the 
pleasure of being alive, particularly in 
relation to the places with which one 
is most often associated. Place release 
as process undermines place when the 
pleasure of the place becomes unset-
tled or unsettling in some way. The 
place less often or no longer offers 
enjoyable surprises and unexpected-
ness; users feel less a zest for daily 
life to which the place formerly con-
tributed. 
    In a more crippling mode, release 
as undermining place can involve dis-
ruptive, non-expected situations 
whereby one is upset, frightened, or 
hurt—for example, one happens by 
chance to be mugged in front of the 
apartment house where he or she 
lives…. 
    [Broadly, place release refers] to 
encounters and happenings that can-
not be foreseen or predicted from 
one’s past or present experience. Such 
events demonstrate that many things 
in life are unforeseeable and appar-
ently fortuitous. They may be propi-
tious and gratifying; they may be ill-
starred and calamitous. A missed 
train, a chance meeting, a wrong 
turn—place happenings like these 
may be momentary disruptions or 
life-changing events. They offer re-
freshing or baleful possibilities. 
    As with the place interaction and 
identity [the two place processes Sea-
mon discusses before release], place 
release demands its own thorough 
phenomenology, and here I overview 
three topics that future phenomenolo-
gies might explore more thoroughly: 
first, the moment in which unexpected 
experiences happen; second, situa-
tions in which the unexpected experi-
ence triggers a chain of consequential 
place events, some of which are only 
indirectly relatable to the original ex-
perience; and, third, ways that aspects 
of [both the material and human 
worlds] contribute to situations of 
place release (D. Seamon, pp. 118–
19, p. 121). 
 
The being and 
becoming of place 
Table 15.1 [see table next page] sum-
marizes the six place processes as, on 
one hand, they maintain and buoy 
places; or, on the other hand, as they 
undermine and shatter places. In 
thriving places, the six processes mu-
tually support and invigorate each 
other at a wide range of generative 
levels and environmental scales. Ro-
bust places give pleasure to their us-
ers, who in turn feel attachment to 
those places and may wish to preserve 
and strengthen them through responsi-
ble, well-considered actions, plans, 
and constructions whereby robustness 
is intensified further. 
    One must emphasize, however, that 
the six processes can weaken place. 
For example, American post-war ur-
ban-renewal programs exemplify a 
mode of place creation in which pol-
icy makers and planners, partly out of 
ignorance as to how places work, im-
posed an inappropriate mode of place 
intensification that unsettled or de-
stroyed the animated street life and 
genius loci of many American cities 
and their neighborhoods and dis-
tricts…. 
    Another example is superficial 
modes of place intensification that in-
corporate inappropriate environmental 
designs contributing to an erosion of 
place rather than to its invigoration—
e.g., public plazas that include no 
seating; megastructures that turn their 
backs to the sidewalk and street; or a 
hierarchical pathway structure that in-
terferes with ease of pedestrian move-
ment…. 
    In examining the six processes as 
they unfold in lived relationship, one 
notes that the first four (interaction, 
identity, release, and realization) re-
late more to the being of a place: 
What that place is, how it maintains 
itself, and how and why people are at-
tached to that place. The processes of 
place interaction and place identity 
might be called the generative foun-
dations of place and place experience, 
since they point to the everyday ac-
tions, meanings, and attachments that 
presuppose and ground robust places. 
Through place interaction, partici-
pants identify with place for which 
they feel fondness, concern—even de-
votion and profound loyalty. In turn, 
this lived reciprocity between place 
interaction and identity sustains place 
release in that environmental seren-
dipity offers the surprises and pleas-
ures of place unexpectedness. Yet 
again, a supportive reciprocity among 
interaction, identity, and release ener-
gizes place realization and a distinc-
tive atmosphere and character that, 
though largely ineffable, become an 
integral place quality. 
    If the first four processes contribute 
to a synergistic understanding of what 
places are and how they work in day-
to-day fashion, the two remaining 
processes (intensification and crea-
tion) speak to the becoming of place: 
How robust places might be envi-
sioned and actualized via empathetic 
understanding and action (creation) 
and well-crafted improvements in the 
place (intensification). 
Place creation requires dedicated, 
well-informed individuals who 
thoughtfully improve place, whereas 
place intensification identifies the in-
dependent power of appropriate de-
signs and fabrications to revive and 
strengthen place by being one way 
materially and spatially rather than 
some other. The result is that place 
becomes better or more durable in 
some way—for example, increasing 
sidewalk traffic by creatively rede-
signing street fronts; or enhancing 
street activity by making an urban dis-
trict’s pathway grid more connected 
and permeable for pedestrians (Sea-
mon, pp. 166–69). 
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Seamon’s six place processes: Sustaining and undermining aspects* 
Place process Sustaining aspects Undermining aspects 
Place interaction 
 
The goings-on in a place, both ordi-
nary and day-to-day and out-of-the-or-
dinary and eventful; “a day in the life of 
the place”; the daily, weekly, and sea-
sonal “rounds” of a place. 
Typical interactions of place become fewer 
or destructive; the pleasure of being part of 
place is undermined by discomfort, stress, 
nuisance, inefficiency, fear, and so forth. 
Place identity 
 
Taking up place as a significant part of 
one’s world; accepting and recognizing 
place as integral to one’s personal and 
communal identity; feeling that one be-
longs to place; unself-conscious being-
in-place. 
People associated with a place feel uncom-
fortable with taking up that place as a part of 
their world; one mistrusts or feels threatened 
by the people and events of the place; one 
loses her unself-conscious sense of belong-
ing to the place; one feels a lived separation 
from a place that before was an essential 
part of who one was. 
Place release 
 
An environmental serendipity of unex-
pected encounters and events; people 
are “released” more deeply into them-
selves through gaining pleasure from 
surprises-in-place. 
Serendipitous events unfold that make one 
anxious, unsettled, or fearful; unfortunate 
surprises undercut people’s sense of secu-
rity and safety. 
Place realization 
 
The power of place to generate an en-
vironmental order with a specific 
rhythm, ambience, and character. 
The physical and lived order of place deterio-
rates or disintegrates; the ambience of the 




The ways that the physical, material, 
and spatial environment works as an 
independent agent for strengthening 
place; the active role played by archi-
tecture, design, planning, and policy in 
making place one way rather than an-
other. 
Arbitrary, imposed plans, designs, fabrica-
tions, and policies upset and undermine 
place; inappropriate constructions and inter-
ventions squelch the life of the place. 
Place creation 
 
People-in-place, out of concern and at-
tachment, envision and reshape place 
in ways whereby it is sustained and 
strengthened. 
Individuals and groups misunderstand place 
and impose unsuitable policies, designs, and 
actions that weaken place and ignore its 
unique qualities and character. 
  
      *Reproduced from Seamon 2018, Table 15.1, p. 168. 
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in locating references. See EAP, spring, 2013, for the “in memoriam” issue devoted to Bortoft, including his essay, “The Trans-
formative Potential of Paradox.”  © 2018 Jacqueline Bortoft. 
 
he central question I ask is what 
contribution Goethean science 
makes to understanding the 
wholeness of nature. I contend 
that there is something to be known about 
the wholeness of nature to which Goethean 
science can contribute. I was first intro-
duced to the problem of wholeness by 
physicist David Bohm (1917–1992), when 
I became one of his post-graduate research 
students in the early 1960s (Bohm 1980, 
2003; Bortoft 1982). Today, Bohm’s name 
is associated with wholeness and quantum 
physics but, in fact, this topic was first rec-
ognized and explored by physicist Niels 
Bohr (1885–1962), who saw that a new 
factor in physics—what he called “an indi-
visible wholeness” and completely absent 
in classical physics—arose because of the 
indivisibility of the quantum itself. 
Bohr was particularly concerned about 
the consequences of this indivisibility for 
measurement, a problem that led him to 
speak of the “unanalyzable wholeness” of 
the measuring apparatus and the phenome-
non being measured. Faced with this con-
cern, Bohr adopted a somewhat pessimistic 
view: Although physicists might be able to 
speak of the bare concept, “wholeness,” 
this was all they could say. Thus, there was 
no possibility of identifying a more ade-
quate, content-filled concept of wholeness 
than its “unanalyzability.” 
Bohr proposed that wholeness is an irra-
tionality in nature just as the square root of 
the number two is an irrationality in math-
ematics. And just as the incommensurabil-
ity of the length of the diagonal of a trian-
gle with unit sides is accommodated by the 
extension of the system of integers and 
fractions to “cover” cases that do not fit 
into that number system, so Bohr believed 
it possible to accommodate the “irrational” 
wholeness in quantum physics by an anal-
ogous procedure of using the concepts of 
classical physics (the only physics he 
thought there could be) in a way that would 
“cover” wholeness, even though whole-
ness as such does not fit into that concep-
tual system. 
Here, we reach Bohm’s disagreement 
with Bohr: Bohm believed it was possible 
to have a content-filled idea of wholeness. 
The huge problem was how to do it? 
 
he irreducible wholeness in quan-
tum physics is seen dramatically in 
the case of interference experiments 
with a single-photon light source. There 
arises the difficulty of thinking of the sin-
gle photon as having a definite path as 
would be the case if the photon were a clas-
sical particle. If we insist that the photon is 
a classical particle, then we find ourselves 
in the contradictory position of saying that 
the single photon travels simultaneously in 
both one path and two paths. How at the 
same time can something that seems one 
also seem two? Here, with a vengeance, we 
have the irreducible wholeness of quantum 
indivisibility. As physicist Arthur Zajonc 
(1995, p. 299) explained, 
 
Goethe was right [when he said about 
light, “How often do they strive to divide 
that which, despite everything, would al-
ways remain single and whole?”]. Try 
though we may to split light into fundamen-
tal atomic pieces, it remains whole to the 
end. Our very notion of what it means to be 
elementary is challenged. Until now we 
have equated smallest with most funda-
mental. Perhaps for light, at least, the most 
fundamental feature is not found in small-
ness but rather in wholeness. 
 
Completely absent from the world of 
classical physics, the irreducible “quantum 
wholeness” became even more evident in 
the discussions between Einstein and Bohr 
that eventually led to the formulation of the 
paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 
(EPR) and its later reformulation in Bell’s 
inequality theory (which has now received 
remarkable experimental confirmation; see 
Zajonc 1995). This research made evident 
that quantum wholeness cannot be de-
scribed in terms of independent elements 
externally connected. 
Quantum “non-locality” (as it is called) 
seems to involve “two” objects that are far 
apart physically and yet can be connected 
instantaneously as if they are not separated 
at all. Again, we have a situation where the 
language used contradicts what one is try-
ing to say—i.e., we are trying to describe 
quantum non-locality in the language of 
physical locality. 
In the quantum domain, reality cannot be 
broken down into independent parts and 
hence cannot be analyzed (if we mean by 
that word “broken apart and measured”). 
At this fundamental level of presence, the 
world cannot be thought of as composed of 
independent parts connected together in 
some way. 
We do, however, continue to think in 
terms of parts and whole, largely because 
the very form of our language channels our 
doing so. Bohm pointed to the fact that the 
subject-verb structure assumed by modern 










separate entities acting on other entities, in-
teracting by connections external to those 
entities themselves. He stressed how nouns 
are the dominant form, whereas earlier lan-
guages were often verb-based and there-
fore did not encourage speakers to think 
primarily in terms of separate, localized 
entities. 
Niels Bohr himself was acutely aware of 
the crucial role that language plays in hu-
man understanding. In fact, it was a major 
source of his epistemological pessimism 
regarding quantum theory. As he ex-
plained, “We are suspended in language in 
such a way that we cannot say what is up 
and what is down” (Petersen 1985, p. 302). 
Since Bohr assumed we cannot escape 
from this situation, he thought that the only 
way we could describe the quantum world 
was via concepts already available to us—
i.e., the concepts of classical physics. 
Hence, we had to learn how to use these 
concepts in such a way as to accommodate 
“irrational” quantum wholeness without 
leading our understanding into contradic-
tion. He mounted a heroic rearguard de-
fense for a situation that he perceived as 
impossible. 
 
ohm thought differently and 
brought attention to the relation-
ship between forms of language 
and ways we perceive and think about the 
world. It was studying this relationship that 
partly led to my working with British phi-
losopher J.G. Bennett (1897–1974) on the 
problem of language and the perception of 
wholeness. Bennett was particularly inter-
ested in time, believing that our ordinary 
language led us into wrong ways of think-
ing about temporal processes (Bennett 
1956–1966). In my work with him, he pro-
posed an experiment in which we adopted 
an artificial language that modified the 
way we describe simple actions and events 
(Bennett, Bortoft, and Pledge 1965). 
The aim was to see how this different 
language might modify our perceptions. A 
key feature of the experiment was to avoid 
introducing what Bennett called “descrip-
tive fictions”—i.e., factors introduced into 
descriptions that could not be found in ex-
perience. These factors often took the form 
of connecting linkages added to what was 
given directly in experience—for example, 
hypothetical entities functioning as hidden 
causal mechanisms. Whereas what was 
connected entered directly into experience, 
these connections themselves did not be-
cause they were postulated speculatively. 
The discipline required to describe ac-
tions and events, excluding all interpretive 
fictions and yet giving a thorough descrip-
tion, seemed to focus our thinking in a 
new, unfamiliar way (as well as evoking 
states of extreme irritation and exaspera-
tion). We began to experience “break-
throughs” into a new kind of perception. 
There was a transformation in the mode of 
togetherness of the elements. At first, we 
saw these elements only as separated from 
each other but, over time, we realized they 
were connected directly. In other words, 
they were connected at the start and, there-
fore, there was no need to propose some 
extra “connection” added on after the fact. 
In seeing this mode of togetherness in 
this transformative way, we realized that 
one can see wholeness directly, where 
“seeing” means phenomenological seeing 
and not the empiricist’s reduction of seeing 
to just sense perception [1]. Although the 
context was different, we felt we had be-
gun to learn how to do what Bohr had de-
clared impossible: to see wholeness di-
rectly as it is in itself (Bortoft 1971). 
 
ecause nothing extra is added, this 
experience of transformation in the 
mode of togetherness can be de-
scribed as a situation where “nothing has 
changed, but everything is different.” 
When we see that the connections are in-
trinsic rather than extrinsic, separation 
does not suddenly disappear. Rather, we 
have both together: both separation and 
wholeness. The experience is twofold but 
not dual. 
One can make a parallel with reading. 
Consider the three letters “c,” “a,” and “t” 
as they appear in the word “cat.” Perceptu-
ally, the letters appear as separate, and we 
might attempt to overcome this separation 
by introducing external linkages as with 
“c-a-t.” This device, however, eclipses the 
possibility of reading. When we recognize 
the meaning “cat,” the letters remain sepa-
rate but are also connected in a subtler way 
than linking them together by introducing 
an external connection of hyphens. This 
experience of seeing the meaning in com-
plete words (rather than as separated but 
connected letters) parallels the experience 
of seeing wholeness directly. 
Although I didn’t know at the time, this 
way of seeing is in tune with Wittgen-
stein’s “new way of thinking.” What I also 
didn’t realize was that the transformation 
in Wittgenstein’s philosophy marking his 
later extraordinarily creative period was 
brought about by his encounter with the 
work of Goethe [2]. Wittgenstein’s later 
philosophy is concerned with “the under-
standing that consists in seeing connec-
tions,” which for him was a kind of seeing 
that did not need explanation because con-
nections are encountered directly. This di-
rect seeing of connections was crucial for 
Wittgenstein because he saw this kind of 
seeing as understanding so that seeing and 
understanding are one, and there is no need 
for explanation because it is replaced by 
seeing. Wittgenstein emphasized that to 
connect two things, we do not need a third 
because things connect directly—i.e., they 
already stand in connection with one an-
other, and therefore there is no need to in-
troduce some additional connection exter-
nally [3]. 
 
y first encounter with Goethe 
came later and happened, by a 
stroke of good fortune, when a 
friend mentioned a book he thought I might 
find interesting—philosopher Ernst Lehrs’ 
Man or Matter (Lehrs 1958), an introduc-
tion to Goethe’s way of science. In reading 
the book’s fifth chapter, “The Adventure of 
Reason,” I suddenly found myself feeling 
completely at home. The limitation that 
Kant put on the human cognitive capacity 
to know wholes—“Above all, it is not 
given to such a thinking to think ‘wholes’ 
in such a way that through an act of thought 
alone the single items contained in them 
can be conceived as parts springing from 
them by necessity” (Lehrs 1958, p. 82)—
reminded me of Bohr’s strictures on our 
ability to understand quantum wholeness 
[4]. But here was Goethe declaring that he 
had done in practice the very thing that 
Kant declared impossible in principle for 
the human mind to know [5]. 
In his conversation with Schiller, Goethe 
had said that “there must certainly be an-
other way altogether [rather than a piece-











vided in pieces, but presented her as work-
ing and alive, striving out of the whole into 
the parts” (Lehrs 1958, p. 104). Goethe’s 
work on the metamorphosis of plants illus-
trated this movement from the whole into 
the parts, rather than aiming to move from 
the parts to the whole, in the way it showed 
all the different organs up to the stem as 
metamorphoses of one and the same plant 
organ (Goethe 1790/2009). 
As I read Lehrs, it seemed evident to me 
that Goethe could see the wholeness in na-
ture directly and, more so, had developed a 
set of specific practices that could lead to 
this holistic way of seeing. In fact, one of 
these methods—exakte sinnliche phantai-
sie, or “exact sensorial imagination”—was 
familiar to me already from working with 
Bennett. We had found that the practice of 
what we called “visualization” to be ex-
tremely valuable for using the mind in a 
way allowing us to disengage from the ha-
bitual activity of mental associations, a 
dominant characteristic of the ordinary, 
discursive mind [6]. 
Besides Goethe’s plant studies, there 
was also his work on color (Goethe 
1810/1970). Here, his insistence on staying 
with the phenomenon and refusing to go 
“behind” it by the artifice of introducing 
hypothetical concepts or models seemed to 
be the aim of my work with Bennett, albeit 
our results were far inferior to Goethe’s ef-
forts, which had produced what amounted 
to an entirely new way of doing science 
(Bortoft 1996; Seamon and Zajonc 1998). 
I also immediately made a connection 
between Goethe’s work and quantum 
physics in that Goethe’s method pointed to 
the renouncement not only of classical 
models in physics but of all models as 
such. This is the positive side of Bohr’s un-
derstanding: by insisting that all models be 
renounced, he thereby returned physics to 
being truly phenomenological—in other 
words, returning to the original phenomena 
from which physics as a science arose. 
 
learly, there was much to learn 
from Goethe, and I began to ex-
plore his work in detail (Bortoft 
1985, 1986, 1996, 2012, 2013). At about 
the same time as I began this task, Bohm 
distributed draft versions of his two papers 
on the implicate order, in which he took the 
hologram as a metaphor for the kind of 
wholeness that he saw as a fundamental 
new order in physics (Bohm 1980, chaps. 
6 and 7). As with Goethe, here was another 
instance of going from the whole to the 
part. I realized that it should be possible to 
use this way of understanding to show how 
the radically new direction taken by Goe-
the was a reversal of our habitual way of 
thinking. At the same time, one could use 
Goethe’s approach to illuminate Bohm’s 
notion of an intrinsically implicate order. I 
was never able, however, to interest Bohm 
in the connection with Goethe, perhaps be-
cause he was not willing to see past scien-
tists’ and philosophers’ typical stereotypi-
cal understanding of Goethe’s science. 
Also at this time, I discovered phenome-
nology, which came as a revelation—an 
experience of stepping into a different di-
mension of mind, but one that is there in 
front of us all the while, only hidden from 
our customary assumptions. The funda-
mental insight of Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy is that we see the necessary structure 
of experience—the intrinsic necessity—
and not just the discrete particulars of ex-
perience that empiricism assumes. Percep-
tion is twofold: simultaneously, an aware-
ness of contingent particulars (just the facts 
as such) and perception of necessary struc-
tures, connections, and relations among the 
facts (the idea as such). Empiricism does 
not recognize this complementarity, col-
lapsing the two into one, which it identifies 
with sense experience only. The result is 
endless confusion—e.g., the notion that 
experience itself is incomplete and re-
quires something added by “the mind.” 
The key point is that we see directly the 
way in which the particulars are neces-
sarily connected. We do not infer the nec-
essary connection by means of intellectual 
speculation after seeing. We see the neces-
sary structure directly because to know is 
to see—this is Husserl’s fundamental in-
sight and is not a metaphor. While we may 
say that seeing the necessary structure in 
the facts is analogous to the sensory seeing 
of the facts, it would be better to turn the 
phrasing around and say that sensory see-
ing is a particular species of seeing (instead 
of being the only real case of seeing, as is 
conventionally assumed). 
It is the recognition of this integral to-
getherness of seeing and knowing that 
prompted Goethe’s reply to Schiller, who 
had said, “That is no experience. That is an 
idea.” But Goethe responded, “I am glad to 
have ideas without knowing it, and to see 
them with my very eyes.” 
Looking back via Husserl, we recognize 
that Goethe’s statement was an attempt to 
express the insight that only came later 
with phenomenology—namely, that we 
can and do see ideas directly, but that lack-
ing an adequate basis for being able to say 
this, Goethe made the mistake of attrib-
uting this seeing to sense perception. There 
is both a positive and negative here: nega-
tive, in that Goethe was mistaken about 
knowing being a matter of sense percep-
tion; positive, in that he recognized a way 
of knowing that is seeing. 
In one sense, Goethe was a phenomenol-
ogist, and phenomenology is a crucial way 
of understanding his work, since it has al-
ways been too easy to mistake his efforts 
as naïve empiricism, which is not the case 
at all. It is his phenomenological way of 
seeing that is exemplified to some degree 
by his science of color and his work on the 
morphology of plants. One finds more re-
cent examples in the work of zoologist 
Wolfgang Schad (1977) on the morphol-
ogy of mammals; and the work of biologist 
Craig Holdrege (1998) on seeing animals 
whole. There is also the work of ecologist 
Mark Riegner (1993, 1998), who examines 
the wholeness of landscapes as revealed 
through their flora and fauna. 
 
s my work proceeded, the discov-
ery of an unsuspected affinity be-
tween Husserl’s phenomenology 
and Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was 
particularly astonishing, since many com-
mentators claimed that the two thinkers 
were philosophical antipodes. What we re-
alize today, however, is that both Husserl 
and Wittgenstein, in different ways, were 
working toward the same recognition: that 
there is a direct kind of seeing that under-
stands without explaining—without the 
need to explain—because this way of un-
derstanding is seeing. For Husserl, to know 
is to see; this aim takes the form of seeing 
the necessary, intrinsic structures of the 
phenomenon. For Wittgenstein, there is a 
way of seeing that is also a way of under-
standing, which takes the form of seeing 










wherein things are together directly be-
cause they “already stand in connection 
with one another.” 
In this sense, the differences between 
Husserl and Wittgenstein are far less sig-
nificant than their common ground: an ex-
perience of direct seeing likened meta-
phorically to another dimension of the phe-
nomenon itself. In other words, what at the 
start is seen as only “two-dimensional” is 
suddenly seen as “three-dimensional” [7].  
 
ut only with the publication of Ray 
Monk’s Wittgenstein biography in 
1990 (Monk 1990), did I first learn 
of the crucial influence that Goethe had on 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on “the under-
standing that consists of connections.” 
Monk claims that this emphasis on seeing 
connections has no precedent in the West-
ern philosophical tradition “unless one 
finds a place for Goethe… in that tradition” 
(Monk 1990, p. 316). In this sense, one 
might describe the Goethean way of seeing 
the wholeness of nature in the manner of 
either Husserl or Wittgenstein. For exam-
ple, in his perceptive study of the horned 
mammals, Schad makes visible what he 
calls “the awesome inner logic of the or-
ganism” (Schad 1977, p. 118), which could 
just as easily be interpreted as seeing the 
necessary structure or principle (Husserl) 
or seeing the “grammar” of intensive con-
nections (Wittgenstein). 
Reflecting on the beginnings of my own 
interest in the question of wholeness, I re-
alize that the work done by a small group 
of us with philosopher J. G. Bennett in the 
1960s was unwittingly an initiation into a 
wider movement in modern consciousness. 
Our stumbling attempts to learn how to see 
wholeness directly in things, prepared a 
doorway for us to enter into a much more 
comprehensive cultural stream than any of 
us could have realized at the time. The 
pathway I have taken since then reveals 
certain unexpected affinities: 
 
▪ Goethe’s way of seeing is illuminated by 
Husserl’s phenomenology, which 
among other things, shows us the differ-
ence between Goethe’s science and the 
phenomenalism for which superficially 
it can be mistaken; 
▪ Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was in-
spired directly by his encounter with 
Goethe’s way of seeing; consequently, 
Goethe’s way of seeing is illuminated by 
Wittgenstein, just as Wittgenstein’s 
“new way of thinking” is illuminated by 
Goethean science; 
▪ Husserl and Wittgenstein were, each in 
his own way, really concerned with the 
same kind of seeing; thus, unexpectedly, 
one realizes an affinity between two 
thinkers long thought to be different in 
their ways of understanding. 
 
As I hope the above discussion indicates, 
I am interested primarily in seeing and un-
derstanding wholeness, which necessarily 
requires a phenomenological science. My 
concern with Goethean science is the ex-




1. At the time, because we were not aware of the 
phenomenological perspective, we were not able to 
make this distinction between seeing directly and see-
ing reduced to sense perceptions. 
2. And at the time, I knew nothing of Goethe either. 
3. During the time I worked with Bennett, we were 
influenced by Wittgenstein in the approach we took 
toward language, but his influence was mostly limited 
to our emphasizing the ways in which language can 
“sleepwalk” us into using concepts inappropriate for 
a given situation, leading one into confusion that he 
or she then mistakes for some difficulty in the situa-
tion itself—for example, a “problem” to be “solved.” 
This alternative way of seeing was very much “in the 
air” in Britain in the 1960s, but we were unaware of 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on a new kind of seeing—
i.e., an understanding that sees connections and thus 
removes any need for explanation. 
4. These strictures might have been because Bohr 
had absorbed the Kantian attitude. 
5. Kant’s motivation here may well have been that 
he hoped to save Newtonian mathematical physics 
not only from the skepticism of Humean empiricism 
but also from the claims of Swedenborgian “spirit 
seeing,” which for Kant posed an equal threat to what 
he saw as the greatest achievement of human 
knowledge—mathematical physics. 
6. The capacity to form mental images intention-
ally was crucial for Bennett, and he sometimes called 
the practice by the German word vorstellung. 
7. At a 1986 seminar at London’s Goethe Institute, 
philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer declared that 
“Wittgenstein has the same kind of phenomenological 
imagination as Husserl.” Philosopher John Heaton 
told me that people in Vienna who knew Wittgenstein 
in the 1930s said that he was really doing phenome-
nology (and this at a time when, according to the 
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hat is the felt experience of 
inner space? If asked to 
close your eyes and “go in-
side,” what does it feel like 
and what are the sensations? Where does 
this experience originate? Is it something 
purely internal and different for each per-
son, or are there external influences as 
well? What does it feel like to be within a 
place? Do different places engender differ-
ent experiences of inner-ness? 
I raise these questions because of a re-
cent trip to the sandstone canyon country 
northwest of Sydney, an experience that 
left me wondering about the relationship 
between the forms of the landscape we en-
counter and the sense of interiority within 
one’s self and body. 
 
he Wollemi Wilderness Area is the 
largest designated wilderness area 
in Australia, covering 900,000 
acres. This region is a deeply dissected 
plateau of predominantly Narrabeen and 
Hawkesbury sandstone beds laid down to a 
depth of 500 meters about 250 million 
years ago. Uplift of the plateau, which con-
tinues today, caused deep vertical joints in 
the rock that have been used by small 
streams to begin carving narrow canyons 
almost 100 million years ago, some of 
which are only several meters wide, yet 
hundreds of meters deep. Access is via 
rough walking tracks across the dry 
scrubby heathland at the top, while the 
vegetation at the bottom of the canyons is 
temperate rainforest with sassafras, coach-
wood, and tree ferns where there is insuffi-
cient light for trees to grow [1]. 
My first introduction to this country was 
30 years ago. I vividly recall scrambling 
through scratchy bushland and across ex-
posed rock ledges for hours, finding myself 
at the top of a rope ladder that seemed to 
drop down into another realm. I clung to 
the ladder so tightly that I grazed my 
knuckles while descending the 20-meter 
cliff to the accompaniment of the walk 
leader’s encouraging comments that “it 
was worth it.” 
As I stepped back from the rope at the 
bottom in relief, I discovered how right he 
was. A crystalline stream ran between the 
sandstone walls, creating an enclosed, 
moist, ferny world. Rainforest trees tow-
ered above us in a cathedral-like space. I 
looked about in wonder at this paradise I 
hadn’t known existed.  
I couldn’t wait to return and, for the 17 
years I lived in the Greater Sydney region, 
I was a regular visitor, alone and with oth-
ers. Just before I left to live in Tasmania in 
2005, I finally persuaded my sister Trish to 
allow me to show her the canyon country 
on an overnight camp. She was immedi-
ately smitten and has since become a keen 
canyoneer and bush walker. On my an-
nual visits to Sydney, she has returned the 
favor and introduced me to canyons in 
which I had never set foot. This year for 
the first time, we carried tents and sleep-
ing bags so that we could camp for three 
days. 
A fortnight before, I had been on an or-
ganized four-day walk on Bruny Island 
described as a “deep ecology yatra” [2]. 
The leaders of the walk, loosely based on 
Buddhist practices of walking meditation, 
guided us on a daily cycle of largely silent 
activity. 
The day started at 6:30 am with an hour 
and a half of yoga and meditation aimed 
at guiding one’s physical actions and bod-
ily attention via the breath. When we be-
gan walking, we were instructed to keep 
our attention on our feet through the 
rhythm of breath, then to extend it to the 
legs, the whole body, the vegetation and 
wildlife, the sky and birds, then back again. 
By the end of the yatra, this rhythm had 
permeated the way I moved through the 
bushland. When I returned home to my 
Tasmanian home at Blackstone, the after-
effects continued [3]. I moved more 
slowly, I noticed more, and familiar places 
felt more intensely like they were part of a 
connected whole. I suggested to Trish that 
we adopt on our walk a similar structure to 
the yatra, to which she readily agreed. 
 
An immersion in place 
Those three days were a total immersion in 
place. Even before setting foot into the 
canyon proper, we could feel the change in 
the air. From the blazing sun of an Austral-
ian summer day, it was only a few paces 
into coolness and instant relief to our 









shadow and the refreshing moistness 
within it. We squeezed through crevices 
only a foot wide in places, flattening back, 
chest and arms against the rock to gain 
maximum traction, extending our hands 
into narrow fissures to grip a wedged stone 
to pull ourselves upwards.  
Investigating a side ravine that had a 90-
degree bend in it, I wormed my way for-
ward on my belly, feeling every square 
inch of my body in contact with sandstone 
above and beneath me. Looking up at the 
narrow strip of sky a hundred meters above 
emphasized the feeling of being inside the 
rock. It was a different sense of “inside-
ness” than being in a cave, where one is 
completely enclosed in rock but has no vis-
ual clues about how far beneath the earth’s 
surface one is. 
Occasionally, a large rockfall blocked a 
canyon and formed a pool extending from 
wall to wall so that the only way to proceed 
was through the water. We wore thermal 
vests over swimming costumes and were in 
and out of the water all day, swimming and 
wading, clambering up or under waterfalls. 
The canyon walls were constantly weeping 
in misty veils or seeps that dripped in syn-
copated splashes onto rock platforms. We 
were surrounded by the sound and sensa-
tion of falling water. 
The chasm floor was mostly in shadow, 
but, when the angle was right, sunlight 
beamed down along golden shafts. 
Midway along the River Cave 
canyon, one of these shafts 
touched the stream, and I hastened 
toward it, knowing it would re-
main there only briefly. I stood in 
the shower of honeyed light, feel-
ing the physicality of the rays as 
they poured down from the 
heights as if the proximity to the 
mass of cliffs on either side had 
given them added density. I turned 
and smiled at Trish, who pointed 
out the reflections of ripples on the 
underside of the rock ledge just 
above us. 
As I gazed at the undulating pat-
terns, I noticed, in the center, a 
zone of opacity. It took me several 
seconds to recognize my own 
shadow because it was unlike any 
I’d seen before—indistinct, con-
stantly changing at the margins, 
and partially translucent in the 
middle where light caught the 
edges of ripples. It wasn’t person-shaped at 
all, but was stretching out and retracting 
fluidly like an active ghost figure. I seemed 
to be seeing the energy-form of my body. 
 
t the end of the second day, as I sat 
on a stone next to the campfire, 
stirring the pot of freeze-dried kale 
and turkey for dinner, I was aware of 
strange rhythmical movements in the mus-
cles of my limbs and trunk. It felt as if I 
was still in the water, or perhaps more ac-
curately, as though the creek water was 
coursing through my body. We’d spent a 
long while at the top of a cascade and then 
beside a narrow channel, watching how the 
water wasn’t flowing steadily, but in 
pulses, irregular but still rhythmic surges 
and retractions. 
Now that I was externally at 
rest, I sensed an internal puls-
ing in sympathy with the 
rhythm of the stream. The 
nearest analogy I can give is 
the experience of gazing into a 
fast-flowing river for some 
time before transferring one’s 
gaze to the riverbank and “see-
ing” the earth of the bank flow-
ing into the river. In this case, 
though, it wasn’t a trick of the 
eye, but a distinct physical sensation, em-
bodying the pulse of the falling water. 
After dinner, we let the fire die down and 
stretched out, looking up at the thin strip of 
night sky strewn across with stars, appreci-
ating the contrast between the warm ruby 
light glowing from the coals close by and 
the remote sapphire starlight. Trish 
glanced down and exclaimed, “What’s that 
star doing down there?” Below us was a 
point of bluish light. I blinked uncompre-
hendingly at the impossibility of its loca-
tion, my eyes still focused on the far distant 
sky. 
Then we both remembered. Glow-
worms! Earlier that day we’d been told that 
there might be glowworms in the camping 
cave, and here they were, masquerading as 
stars. As the night progressed, more worms 
began to glimmer until the cave walls 
seemed as densely lit as the night sky. In 
the darkness, I felt enveloped in the senso-
rium of the warmth of the fire, the soft 
plashing of the stream below, and the star-
light near and far. We sat for a long while, 
not speaking. I let myself drift in this space 
where glow-worms and galaxies appeared 
equally distant, equally large.  
Camping in the canyons deepens the im-
mersion in its soundscape. In the curved, 
cavernous spaces, sounds are naturally am-
plified rather than dissipated as they are in 
flatlands. Just upstream of the camping 
cave, water poured evenly from a rock 
bowl several meters down into a deep hol-
low that resonated with a soft bass rumble. 
The echoes of a waterfall farther upstream 
produced one melody, while the small cas-
cades below provided the splashing and 
gurgling treble notes. The effect of the 
whole was a rich and intimate soundscape 
with constant variations: auditory manifes-
tations of the pulses in the water we’d seen 
A 
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earlier. As I settled into my sleeping bag, 
the water music filled the cave and filled 
my body, a fitting accompaniment to the 
after-images of glimmering light. 
 
he canyons reveal the dynamics be-
tween rock and water in myriad 
ways. Peering above me in the 
River Cave, I realized I was looking back 
through its 100-million-year history. The 
vertical slot at the top indicated the initial 
penetration of the jointing. The smooth 
hollow in the southern wall immediately 
below told of a bend in the young creek and 
a pool. After another narrowing, an irregu-
lar broadening of the gorge on both sides 
suggested a time when the stream widened 
into broad rapids. And so on through mil-
lions of years, the episodes of the past laid 
out vertically. I realized that it was similar 
in a way to the succession of different river 
environments we had encountered that 
day—pools and hollows, rapids and rock-
falls, narrow slots and beaches. What we 
saw looking up through geological time 
mirrored what we could see looking back 
over the morning’s journey. 
We went back to the place where I’d first 
noticed the stream surges, and this time I 
was struck by the effect that small-scale 
features in the sandstone had on the pat-
terns of water flow. A tiny ridge of harder 
ironstone cutting transversely across the 
platform sent the water to the left, resulting 
in a deeper channel on that side. As the wa-
ter wore away the rock, the sandstone 
formed channels that guided the stream, 
which then further eroded the rock in a 
rhythmic pattern. This mutual influence 
created a set of “flowforms” across the 
rock platform, pulses of much longer dura-
tion being etched in stone [4]. 
High over our heads loomed cliffs that 
bore the imprint of a different water-rock 
interaction. When groundwater seeping 
downward hits an impermeable band of 
rock, it seeps out at the surface, dissolving 
small amounts of mineral. As the water 
trickles down the rock face, it evaporates 
and leaves a mineral stain behind—black 
for manganese oxides, brown for limonite, 
and red for hematite. 
Some of these stains hung down like 
huge drapes over the cliffs, others took on 
living shapes. Trish pointed out several 
that looked like giant figures of Wandjina, 
the enigmatic spirit beings with great dark 
eyes and white faces that adorn ancient 
rock art in the Kimberley region. 
The first piece of art I purchased, 40 
years ago, was a Wandjina figure 
painted on bark by a contemporary 
Aboriginal painter. To have its un-
canny presence writ large on the 
overhangs close to our camping 
cave brought the landscape even 
more fully alive for me. 
The first night back after the trip, 
I dreamt heavily and deeply. I woke 
suddenly from a dream set by the 
water in bushland. Etched in my 
mind was the phrase, “invitation 
into interiority.” This phrase came 
with an injunction to take it seri-
ously, and I reached for pen and pa-
per. I understood the words to mean 
that the experience of entering the 
canyons silently was like going in-
side oneself. The form of the land—
large dark spaces, still pools, cas-
cades, and flowforms—invites our 
own perceptions of inwardness. 
 
Interiority and the physical body 
The strength of this injunction stayed with 
me over the ensuing weeks and gave me 
direction for further inquiry. The first step 
was to look more closely at what I mean by 
the experience of interiority, or what might 
be termed the phenomenology of inner-
ness. As I embarked on this exploration, I 
was acutely conscious of educator Bron-
wyn Davies’ caution that 
 
awareness of being embodied and, specifi-
cally, being embodied in relation to land-
scape, is something we have little practice 
in observing or articulating. ‘The body’ is 
generally understood as natural and as 
such is taken for granted [5]. 
 
Davies also warns of the dangers of the-
orizing about body-landscapes that be-
comes too cerebral and disembodied. 
There is a way of writing championed by 
Davies in which writing “takes place in a 
simultaneous separation from and immer-
sion in the landscape” [6]. She cites the ex-
ample of novelist Janet Turner Hospital 
who talks of the “eroticized desire to com-
municate” with and about place [7]. 
This desire goes two ways. First, it 
comes from the body’s openness to the 
world, the atavistic urge to merge, the 
yearning to touch and be touched. Second, 
this desire comes from the land itself. 
Years ago, I was part of a small group 
bushwalking in the Blue Mountains, south 
of the Wollemi, with a National Park 
ranger who had spent extensive time with 
Aboriginal people “in country,” in the 
mountains and the desert. As we rested on 
a ledge overlooking a rugged valley, one of 
us raised the question of wilderness and 
whether it was better that some country re-
main untouched and unsullied by human 
presence.  
The ranger disagreed, declaring in pas-
sionate tones that the land was “crying out” 
to be walked, to be sung, to be loved. The 
desire to communicate is eroticized, sen-
sual but not sexual. I think of it as the force 
of eros, with its qualities of relationship, 
imagination, synthesis, and interdepend-
ence [8]. This desire is also outwardly ori-
ented, out of that enfolded relationship and 
toward others, to engage with them in an 
imaginative, embodied way.  
 
oing inside” is for me both an em-
bodied and also a more-than-bod-
ily experience. Having a physical 
body involves proprioception, the sense of 
“where our bodies and limbs are in space” 
[9]. Our bodies, however, are not solid ob-
jects in space. The human trunk and cra-
nium contain significant spaces, which 
complicate the proprioceptive sense. The 









fined as information about the body as per-
ceived from within, refers to the infor-
mation traveling to the brain from sensory 
receptors in the lungs, gut, bladder, and 
other organs [10]. 
Yet concentrated observation reveals a 
diversity of inner spaces that range in their 
accessibility to our awareness. A thousand 
sensations await the person, with her eyes 
closed, invited to put her attention solely 
on the internal spaces within her body. 
I have attempted this mode of attention 
since the canyon trip, and my perceptions 
have sharpened in some instances but re-
main diffuse in others. I am aware of sev-
eral of the spaces in my cranium—the 
channels inside my ears constantly ringing 
with tinnitus; the sinus cavities, especially 
those behind my upper left cheek that 
cause my teeth to ache slightly; my tongue 
resting in my mouth with a narrow connec-
tion through to my nasal passages that be-
comes more evident with a sharp intake of 
breath through the nostrils. Much more 
feebly, I can sense, by shaking my head 
vigorously, that my eyes and brain are held 
in fluids encased within bony hollows.  
Within my trunk there is the chest cavity 
connected by my breath to the bottom of 
my belly, as well as the constricted channel 
of the throat dropping into the stomach and 
the gut below that. I am usually only 
vaguely aware of the bladder as a hollow 
space but can be acutely conscious of it 
when it is full. 
Of the other organs disposed around the 
two major cavity systems, pulmonary and 
digestive, I have virtually no felt sense, just 
the knowledge they exist. The beating 
heart is evident and, with practice, one can 
discern the pulse of the arterial flow into 
more and more precise points in the body. 
If, in just a few months, I have noticed 
some small improvement in my “inner spa-
tial proprioception,” I can only imagine 
how developed it must be in lifetime prac-
titioners of yoga, Feldenkrais, and other 
body-centered disciplines. 
 
hese soft spaces and channels are 
supported by the bones and muscles 
of the skull, ribcage, spine, legs, 
and arms. The overall sensation is of fluid 
hollowness enclosed in flexible solidity 
[11]. In turn, these internal spaces are 
changing dynamically at different frequen-
cies. The most obvious is the rhythmic ex-
pansion and contraction of the lungs and 
gut every ten seconds 
with the movement of 
the breath. 
Like all beginning 
meditators, I was taught 
to pay attention to the 
breath, and particularly 
to the small movements 
in the body with each in-
halation and exhalation. 
These movements are 
less and less pronounced 
the farther one moves 
from the chest, but on 
occasion they become 
subtly discernible even 
in the extremities of legs 
and arms. I slowly realized that we breathe 
with our entire bodies, not just our lungs 
[12]. Similarly, the sense of space opening 
up within the body with each breath atten-
uates away from the lungs, but after pro-
longed quiet sitting, the small sensations of 
expansion of inner space can permeate the 
whole body. 
On a longer cycle, the periodic filling 
and emptying of the bladder every few 
hours is evident, but for me the rumbling 
emptiness before a meal followed by reple-
tion afterward is more dramatic. There are 
interactive dynamics, too. A full gut re-
stricts the internal space available for the 
breath. When I’m afraid, my breath be-
comes shallower, and I feel an overwhelm-
ing hollowness in my “innards.” The 
heart’s beating can accentuate these sensa-
tions; a pounding pulse seems to echo 
throughout my inner cavities at such times. 
 
Interiority and self 
The sculptor Antony Gormley has spent 
decades producing life-sized casts of his 
own body to convey what it feels like to 
inhabit a human body. His partner would 
encase him completely in plaster, except 
for a thin straw through which he breathed. 
During the hours spent while the plaster 
set, Gormley reported that in contrast to the 
extreme confinement of his body, he had a 
sense of a vast space within himself. It took 
him back to a childhood state experienced 
when he was locked in a hot bedroom: 
 
I would have to lie in this single bed not 
moving with my eyes closed. I felt held in 
this tiny prison behind my eyes. After a 
while, I got to grips with this space, I 
learned how to dwell in it. This tight claus-
trophobic oppressive hot space would be-
come darker and cooler and bigger until I 
was highly conscious but floating in this 
deep blue dark infinity [13]. 
 
Via this experience, Gormley learned to 
inhabit inner space at a very early age. The 
objective space within his body, within the 
bounds of the spatial fluctuations brought 
about by bodily processes, didn‘t change. 
What did change, however, was his subjec-
tive sense of space from hot, tight confine-
ment to cool, effortless expansiveness 
[14]. 
Without such enforced impetus, I have 
been far slower to plumb inner space. 
Nowadays, the space that feels deepest in-
side is behind the solar plexus, deep within 
the base of the lungs and extending into the 
top of the belly. The sense of spaciousness 
I feel is not limited to the expanding and 
contracting cubic centimeters therein. 
Sometimes this lived quality feels as 
though “inside” is a vast, resounding cav-
ern and, at other times, an expanse of clear 
sky or a still pool. The feeling intimates a 
mobile space, sometimes quiet, sometimes 
alive with memories and fleeting sensa-
tions, responsive to the quality of attention 
I give it, and in turn generating more spa-
cious attentiveness. 
 
’ve not always had such impressions. 
Indeed, quite the opposite. Earlier in 
life, I was far from introspective. At 
age 28, I was an ambitious young man in a 
hurry, with a high-powered job with a 
multi-national minerals company, when a 
change in circumstances led to my living in 
a cabin high in the Colorado Rockies with 
time on my hands. 
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Heavy snowfalls closed our small min-
ing operation for the winter, and I took to 
snowshoeing through the forests of Doug-
las Fir and Engelmann Spruce in the spar-
kling stillness of freshly fallen snow [15]. 
Over the next few years, I developed a 
strong feeling for these magnificent trees 
and the rocky crags, their substance and 
presence. I recall saying to a friend that, in 
contrast with these great beings, I lacked 
any sense of my own inner being. I felt 
empty. I had a PhD and other achieve-
ments, but there was nothing inside. 
I remember distinctly the combination of 
a physical sensation of hollow-ness in my 
chest and gut, and an intangible sense of 
lacking something essential. This was not 
an abstract impression but a core existen-
tial experience that propelled me into radi-
cal changes in my profession and location, 
into spiritual groups, and then Buddhist 
practice. The impetus was my apprehen-
sion of the disconnection between the fun-
damental being, the “is-ness” of the trees 
and escarpments, and my own sense of 
self. My being was all “out there” and not 
“in here.” Not for the last time, events in 
my life led me into activities for which I 
was ill-equipped [16]. 
 
Maps of human interiority 
There are many maps of human interiority 
to guide the voyager within, but the most 
well developed derive from Eastern spirit-
uality. This is not an accidental occurrence. 
Diagrams of chakras and of chi energy 
have evolved from centuries of diligent ob-
servation and practice within cultures 
highly valuing inner experience. Chakra—
meaning “wheel” in Sanskrit—refers to 
nodes of subtle energy located at various 
points in the physical body. 
The simplest diagram identifies seven 
chakras ascending from the base of the 
spine to the top of the head. In the Tibetan 
system, there are three elements of a subtle 
body locatable within the physical body—
first, channels (tsa); second, inner air or 
winds (lung); and, third, subtle energy 
(tigle). Tibetan lama Sogyal Rinpoche de-
scribes this subtle body as a “psycho-phys-
ical system” of channels through which 
flow the inner winds that carry thoughts 
and sense impressions [17]. Subtle ener-
gies are concentrated at various points in 
the channels. Through advanced yoga 
practices, this system is visualized pre-
cisely and, by directing the mind to a par-
ticular point in the body, the practitioner 
can begin to purify negative thought pat-
terns and awaken the true nature of mind. 
Although I am not an advanced practi-
tioner, I have found that years of medita-
tion and visualization practice have acti-
vated my sense of inner space. The felt 
sense I most associate with that “deepest 
inside” physical space beneath the solar 
plexus is what is called “heart-mind”—
open-heartedness merged with open-mind-
edness, related to such qualities as compas-
sion, generosity, and gratitude. 
The feeling of barren nothingness inside 
is now thankfully gone. At times, the expe-
riences of inner-ness for which I have used 
the metaphors of cavern, sky, or pool are 
charged with potentiality or animated by 
sheer delight in being alive. 
 
n the West, physical and psychological 
interiority are typically treated as sepa-
rate. There are many maps of the psy-
che within the field of psychology. Arche-
typal psychology, for instance, with arche-
types of the masculine and feminine, and 
the individual and collective unconscious, 
proposes quite a different psychic structure 
than the Freudian model of the id, ego, su-
perego, and the various complexes. 
Yet again, psychosynthesis posits an 
“egg diagram,” with an aware self sitting 
within a field of consciousness surrounded 
by three levels of unconsciousness, the 
lower of which contains a constellation of 
un-integrated sub-personalities and the 
Higher Self at the crown of the egg [18]. 
As far as I know, none of the schools of 
psychology map these structures of aware-
ness onto the human body, internally or ex-
ternally. 
Goethe’s way of science is relevant here 
because the different stages of inquiry use 
different mental and intuitive faculties cen-
tered on different parts of the body [19]. At 
the outset, the eyes and the hand are em-
ployed in perceiving and drawing the phe-
nomenon under study. Then follows exact 
sensate imagination, an imagination of the 
real in which the entire life span of the phe-
nomenon is visualized mentally. Intuiting 
the essential nature, or “gesture” of the 
phenomenon occurs after prolonged famil-
iarity, and the locus of bodily attention 
shifts to the heart center. The final stage, 
being of service to the phenomenon, in-
volves acting out of compassion, ever more 
deeply centered within oneself. 
It seems equally possible to approach the 
inner/outer experience without recourse to 
spiritual, psychological, or other systems 
of thought. Paying close attention to one’s 
interior spaces with a quiet mind is an un-
dertaking open to all. 
My experiences so far incline me to the 
view that the motto, “space, the final fron-
tier,” is just as applicable to inner space as 
it is to outer space. As Antony Gormley ex-
plains, “When we close our eyes, we are in 
a space that is immeasurable and is equiv-
alent to the deep space of the cosmos” [20]. 
 
Landscape and inner-ness 
Is it possible to relate these different types 
of human interiority to the form of the land 
and the qualities of the places we encoun-
ter? To return to the aftermath of my 
dream, in what ways do the canyon land-
forms resonate with my perceptions of in-
ner space? In the first instance, the physical 
description of my internal bodily spaces—
a sequence of organic cavities variously 
filled with tissue, fluids, or air connected 
by channels and held within a bony struc-
ture—is reminiscent of the canyon struc-
ture of a series of rock pools joined by 
flowing or falling water and held within 
narrow walls [21]. 
As with the human body, the perception 
of interior spaces in a canyon is dynamic. 
Physiologically, the dynamism relates to 
the periodic filling and emptying of breath, 
food, and waste products. In a canyon, be-
cause they are weather-dependent, the 
movements are more erratic. A sudden 
downpour fills a narrow chasm with ten 
feet of raging water within minutes, and 
lives have been lost as a result. A fierce 
wind howls through a ravine and blasts 
away the barrier between the soft moist 
world “down here, in here” and the harsh 
dry world “up there, out there.” 
The analogy between body and canyon 
can only be partial. For example, the hu-
man body has a network of interacting cir-
culatory systems with many fluids flowing 
in many directions, whereas the canyon has 
only one fluid always flowing downhill. 
The body is highly mobile and undergoes 
significant changes on a scale of a few 
years, whereas equivalent changes to geo-
logical formations often require tens or 
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hundreds of millions of years. Nonethe-
less, the structural similarities have a met-
aphorical strength greater than their literal 
validity. Sitting in the camping cave after 
several days’ immersion, I did feel reso-
nances between the internal structure of 
my body, the processes within it, and the 
configuration of the canyon. 
 
tructural sympathies such as these 
can only penetrate one’s awareness 
if one allows them to. Philosopher 
Val Plumwood argued that two key criteria 
relating to place relationships were much 
more significant than declarations of love 
for that place: the attitude, or disposition 
that one has toward the more-than-human 
world; and the readiness to take action in 
response to the place by training one’s 
senses and directing one’s attention [22]. 
Plumwood’s claims are directly relevant 
to the activity of canyoning. Trish and I 
were very atypical canyoneers. A recent ar-
ticle on the Blue Mountains canyons de-
scribed a day trip into the Danae Brook 
Canyon in the Kanangra region to the south 
of Wollemi [23]. It consisted of a hectic 
day of heart-stopping abseiling down wa-
terfalls, audacious plunges into deep pools, 
and furious boulder hopping at the bottom:  
 
Several short rappels and two huge jumps 
follow. Robens throws himself off the 
stone, howling like a free man, arms and 
legs spread wide in the air, closing them 
like a butterfly right before he hits the wa-
ter 20 feet below. When we reach the bot-
tom, the Danae becomes a steep boulder 
field, which Robens, naked but for his pack 
and tennies, practically runs across. He 
leaps, lands on a slimy, snot-slick stone, al-
most loses his balance, finds his balance, 
and leaps again, all in one fluid motion. 
It’s amazing to watch, like witnessing the 
movements of some earlier, better adapted 
human. In an hour we cover a distance that 
typically requires three. Stumbling and 
falling, I watch Robens dancing and hop-
scotching as if he’d been born for it. 
 
The exuberant physicality of this type of 
canyoning is attractive, but it involves a 
very different disposition toward the can-
yon than Trish and I had. The former atti-
tude might be summarzsed as “nature as 
outdoor gymnasium.” Few canyoneers 
camp in the gorges overnight, which re-
quires a good amount of gear that encum-
bers descents and ascents. Even fewer 
would begin their day with yoga and med-
itation, and spend much of their time in si-
lence. 
 
ate one afternoon, I swam across a 
wide cold pool rimmed with water-
worn ledges and sat in a ferny 
grotto next to a gushing waterfall. “Ha!” I 
exclaimed. The satisfying echo suggested 
to me that I explore the acoustics of the 
place further, and I gave voice to one of the 
Tibetan Buddhist chants I had been taught. 
The bell-shaped hollows and towering 
walls proved to be excellent sounding 
chambers, and the effect was akin to an un-
accompanied choral voice in a cathedral. 
Its rich resonance encouraged me to cast 
reserve aside and chant at full volume. 
When I finished and sat back, resting again 
in the canyon soundscape of falling waters, 
it seemed as though the chanting continued 
to reverberate inwardly as well as within 
the mossy recesses around me. The trans-
lation of two lines of the chant reads: 
 
Immense yin, dimension of inner space 
With the radiant clarity of the sun and the 
moon [24]. 
 
Although within Buddhism, these words 
are directed toward the state of ultimate re-
alization, they also ring true at a simpler 
level. There have been times when I have 
glimpsed a connection between the outer 
appearance of the world as cliffs, cascades, 
and tree ferns, and an inner world vibrating 
with potentiality, on the brink of manifest-
ing visually. It makes sense to me that 
these vibrations are pictured as clear and as 
radiant as moonlight. The interiority in-
cludes my inner being but is vast in scope. 
I’ve approached this apperception before. 
Once, after a late evening visit to the shores 
of Blackstone, I wrote: 
 
Just as the mushroom rock radiated its 
particular “rock-ness” and Mount Wel-
lington with its prominent brow radiated 
its particular “mountain-ness,” so did I, 
quietly sitting there, radiate my own hu-
man-ness. All three beings had an interior 
aspect, and I felt a sense of spaciousness 
opening up within me and beyond me [25]. 
 
The phrase “immense yin,” or vast inner-
ness, also connects with the perspective of 
depth psychology. Psychologists and writ-
ers in the Jungian tradition such as James 
Hillman are concerned with modern per-
ceptions of the world as soul-less, a situa-
tion that may lead to a profound sense of 
alienation and disengagement from natural 
and humanmade worlds. If soul is only 
considered to be the domain of the human 
psyche, there is no place for anima mundi, 
the ancient Greek conception of the world 
soul. Writer Peter Bishop argues that “the 
term ‘inner’ has become confused spatially 
as meaning inside me or you rather than as 
a form of perception which sees the inside 
of everything” [26]. 
 
This contention is worth a closer look. If 
everything has inner-ness, then everything 
in the world is participating in anima 
mundi, which might well be described as 
“immense yin.” If inner-ness only means 
“inside me” or “inside you,” then it be-
comes exclusive and therefore problem-
atic. 
Bishop’s thoughts were stimulated by an 
encounter he’d had on the edge of a salt 
lake in the arid interior of South Australia. 
A harassed family from suburban Mel-
bourne arrived late in the evening in their 
four-wheel-drive vehicle, and the father 
stretched out by the fire, gazed up at the 
night sky and commented how therapeutic 
it was. Bishop is concerned about the psy-
chologizing of the world in which the stars 
or the desert landscape become mere tools 
for modern humanity’s therapeutic benefit. 
Viewing the world as an arena for personal 
psychological growth seemed to him to be 
puerile compared with “the ancient sub-
lime complexity” of the Aboriginal 
worldview [27]. 
In my search for understanding, I am in-
terested in the connection between the 
world inside a person and the interiority of 
the world, physical and metaphysical. I 
suggest that the process of opening to one’s 
interiority in an actively receptive way 
might also be an opening into the inner-
ness of all things. In this sense, the term 
“inner” could mean both “inside me or 
you” and a “form of perception” or even a 
way of “being in the world.” 
My essential point is that the relationship 
between the qualities of a place and one’s 
own interiority is not a passive one: it is 
enacted, requiring, at the least, an active re-
ceptivity to place and to one’s inner states.  
If there is any inherent structural connec-









two criteria of disposition and physical ac-
tion must be met if we are to experience 
that connection. Psychologist John Shotter 
coins the terms “with-ness thinking” (the 
capacity to think with natural phenomena, 
rather than thinking about them from the 
outside), and “with-ness action” (acting in 
concert with wild things rather than acting 
upon them) [28]. 
 
here are numerous Eastern and 
Western traditions of body-cen-
tered awareness that incorporate as-
pects of natural elements, and indigenous 
cultures are particularly predisposed to-
ward these relationships [29]. Many na-
ture-oriented poets also invoke this mode 
of engagement—Gerard Manley Hopkins, 
Rainer Maria Rilke, and Walt Whitman 
come to mind. Whitman’s majestic “Song 
of Myself” is one long paean to the ex-
tended self and its inextricability with the 
natural world [30]. 
As a writer, I am primarily influenced by 
the written word, but other creative artists 
are equally immersed in the natural world 
and internalize its presence to express the 
connection they feel. Philosopher Edward 
Casey offers a striking example from the 
history of Chinese landscape painting: 
 
To begin with, the ancient painter identi-
fies not with a person but with the land-
scape through which he wanders for years 
in preparation for painting; the purpose of 
the wandering is not just to note and ob-
serve but to make himself one with what he 
has moved through… Moreover, this iden-
tification involves a strong factor of inter-
nalization, even to the point of pathology: 
the serious painters of previous centuries, 
says Shen Kua (A.D. 1031-95), “had 
streams and rocks in their vitals, and 
clouds and mists as a chronic illness.” But 
the internalization of the landscape, what-
ever its risks, remains necessary so far as 
painting is concerned [31]. 
 
Casey goes on to quote a maxim of 
T’ang Hou (active c. 1320-30): “Unless 
there are hills and valleys in your heart as 
expansive as immeasurable waves, it will 
not be easy to depict it” [32]. 
If the same were said of writers, the 
standard would be set rather high. In the 
next essay in this series, I examine how 
several writers have approached the interi-
ority of the self and the world, and how the 
two might be related. 
 
Notes 
1. Coachwood (Ceratopetalum apetalum) and Sassa-
fras (Doryphora sassafras) are the primary species of 
trees growing in rainforest pockets in the Wollemi 
canyons. 
2. Yatra is the Sanskrit word for pilgrimage. 
3. “Blackstone” is the name of the 55 acres of land on 
Bruny Island, Tasmania. For an account of my expe-
riences in settling on Blackstone, see J. Cameron, 
Blackstone Chronicles, Bruny Island, Tasmania: 
Blackstone Press, 2016. 
4. Riegner and Wilkes describe an alternating pattern 
of left and right deviation and rotation of flow in wa-
ter that they term a “vortical meander.” See M. 
Riegner and J. Wilkes, Flowforms and the Language 
of Water, in D. Seamon, D. & A. Zajonc, eds., Goe-
the’s Way of Science. Albany, NY, State Univ. of NY 
Press, 1998. 
5. B. Davies, (In)scribing Body/Landscape Relations, 
Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1999, pp. 14–15. 
6. Ibid., p. 61. 
7. J. Turner Hospital, The Last of the Hapsburgs, Col-
lected Stories, St. Lucia: Univ. of Queensland Press, 
1995; quoted in Davies, p. 237. 
8. Lewis Hyde sets up the dynamic between eros and 
logos that is the force of analytic thought, logic, and 
market exchange in The Gift, London: Vintage, 1999. 
9. N. Doidge, The Brain’s Way of Healing, London: 
Allen Lane, 2016, p. 22. 
10. From the Lab of Action and Body, Royal Hol-
loway, Univ. of London website: pc.rhul.ac.uk (ac-
cessed April 18, 2016). 
11. Women, obviously, have a womb, that fertile in-
terior within which new life is nurtured. Arguably, 
this gives women a richer sense of physical interiority 
than men, especially in light of the experiences of the 
fetus in utero, which are shared to some degree by the 
pregnant mother. 
12. If one considers that the intake of breath adds ox-
ygen to the blood circulating throughout the body in 
the arteries, then it is literally true that we breathe with 
our whole bodies. 
13. Speaking in the BBC documentary, Imagine: An-
tony Gormley: Being Human, first broadcast Novem-
ber 3, 2013. 
14. The dynamic between objective and subjective 
spatiality is a key aspect of Jeff Malpas’ philosophical 
topography of place; see J. Malpas, Place and Expe-
rience, 2nd edn., London: Routledge, 2018. 
15. Douglas Fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii) and Engel-
mann Spruce (Picea engelmanii) are large subalpine 
trees growing high in the Colorado Rocky Mountains. 
16. In chapters 4 and 6 of Blackstone Chronicles (see 
note 3), I describe how, in taking on the practical 
management of a large area of degraded rural land, I 
had to overcome my lack of technical aptitude and ha-
bitual inattentiveness. 
17. S. Rinpoche, The Tibetan Book of Living and Dy-
ing, London: Rider, 1992, pp. 248–249. 
18. See R. Assagioli, Psychosynthesis, NY: Viking, 
1965. 
19. Goethe developed a form of scientific inquiry into 
elements of the natural world that combined pro-
longed observation with trained intuition (see Seamon 
and Zajonc, note 4).  
20. See note 5. 
21. Although I’m writing here about the dynamic be-
tween human interiority and the inside of canyons, 
there is a much larger physical interiority at play as 
well—the interior of the Earth. Canyons and other 
crustal phenomena ultimately have their origin in 
forces deep within the Earth. I am particularly inter-
ested in the molten iron-nickel heart of the Earth that 
may be considered as its inner ocean. Its enormous 
flux and surges affect everything on the surface rang-
ing from plate tectonic movements of continents to 
the variability in the Earth’s magnetic field that pro-
tects all life from the ravages of cosmic radiation and 
is an orienting force for many living creatures. 
Knowledge of the inner ocean and its effect provides 
a larger perspective on canyonlands being folds in the 
surface of an Earth with a dynamic, fluid interior. 
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Questions relating to environmental and architectural phenomenology (from EAP, 2014 [vol. 25, no. 3, p. 4]) 
 
Questions relating to phenomenology 
and related interpretive approaches 
and methods: 
❖ What is phenomenology and what does 
it offer to whom?  
❖ What is the state of phenomenological 
research today? What are your hopes 
and concerns regarding phenomenol-
ogy? 
❖ Does phenomenology continue to have 
relevance in examining human experi-
ence in relation to world? 
❖ Are there various conceptual and meth-
odological modes of phenomenology 
and, if so, how can they be categorized 
and described? 
❖ Has phenomenological research been 
superseded by other conceptual ap-
proaches—e.g., post-structuralism, so-
cial-constructionism, critical theory, re-
lationalist and non-representational per-
spectives, the various conceptual 
“turns,” and so forth? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mak-
ing a better world? If so, what are the 
most crucial phenomena and topics to 
be explored phenomenologically? 
❖ Can phenomenological research offer 
practical results in terms of design, 
planning, policy, and advocacy? 
❖ How might phenomenological insights 
be broadcast in non-typical academic 
ways—e.g., through artistic expression, 
theatrical presentation, digital evoca-
tion, virtual realities, and so forth? 
❖ What are the most important aims for 
future phenomenological research? 
❖ Do the various post-structural and so-
cial-constructionist criticisms of phe-
nomenology—that it is essentialist, 
masculinist, authoritative, voluntarist, 
ignorant of power structures, and so 
forth—point toward its demise? 
 
Questions relating to the natural 
world and environmental and ecologi-
cal concerns: 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of na-
ture and the natural world? 
❖ What can phenomenology offer the in-
tensifying environmental and ecological 
crises we face today? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to more 
sustainable actions and worlds? 
❖ Can one speak of a sustainable life-
world? 
❖ What is a phenomenology of a lived en-
vironmental ethic and who are the key 
contributors? 
❖ Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a 
role in caring for the natural world? For 
places? For lifeworlds broadly? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to envi-
ronmental education? If so, in what 
ways? 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of the 
two laws of thermodynamics, especially 
the second law claiming that all activi-
ties, left to their own devices, tend to-
ward greater disorder and fewer possi-
bilities? Are there ways whereby phe-
nomenological understanding of life-
world might help to reduce the acceler-
ating disordering of natural and human 
worlds? 
 
Questions relating to place, place ex-
perience, and place meaning: 
❖ Why has the topic of place become an 
important phenomenological topic? 
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding 
of place contribute to better place mak-
ing? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to a 
generative understanding of place and 
place making? 
❖ What roles do bodily regularity and ha-
bitual inertia play in the constitution of 
place and place experience? 
❖ What are the lived relationships be-
tween place, sustainability, and a re-
sponsive environmental ethic? 
❖ How are phenomenological accounts to 
respond to post-structural interpreta-
tions of space and place as rhizomic and 
a “meshwork of paths” (Ingold)? 
❖ Can phenomenological accounts incor-
porate a “progressive sense of place” 
argued for by critical theorists like 
Doreen Massey? 
❖ Can phenomenological explications of 
space and place account for human dif-
ferences—gender, sexuality, less-
abledness, social class, cultural back-
ground, and so forth? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to the 
politics and ideology of place? 
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding 
of lived embodiment and habitual iner-
tia be drawn upon to facilitate robust 
places and to generate mutual support 
and understanding among places, espe-
cially places that are considerably dif-
ferent (e.g., different ethnic neighbor-
hoods or regions)? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mo-
bility, the nature of “flows,” rhizomic 
spaces, the places of mobility, non-
spaces and their relationship to mobility 
and movement? 
 
Questions relating to architecture and 
environmental design and policy: 
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of archi-
tecture and architectural experience and 
meaning? 
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to bet-
ter architectural design? 
❖ How do qualities of the designable 
world—spatiality, materiality, lived 
aesthetics, environmental embodiment 
etc.—contribute to lifeworlds? 
❖ What are the most pertinent environ-
mental and architectural features con-
tributing to a lifeworld’s being one way 
rather than another? 
❖ What role will cyberspace and digital 
technologies have in 21st-century life-
worlds? How will they play a role in 
shaping designed environments, partic-
ularly architecture? 
❖ What impact will digital advances and 
virtual realities have on physical em-
bodiment, architectural design, and 
real-world places? Will virtual reality 
eventually be able to simulate “real re-
ality” entirely? If so, how does such a 
development transform the nature of 
lifeworld, natural attitude, place, and ar-
chitecture? 
❖ Can virtual worlds become so “real” 
that they are lived as “real” worlds? 
 
Other potential questions: 
❖ What is the lived relationship between 
people and the worlds in which they 
find themselves? 
❖ Can lifeworlds be made to happen self-
consciously? If so, how? Through what 
individual efforts? Through what group 
efforts? 
❖ Can a phenomenological education in 
lifeworld, place, and environmental em-
bodiment assist citizens and profession-
als in better understand the workings 
and needs of real-world places and 
thereby contribute to their envisioning 
and making? 
❖ Is it possible to speak of human-rights-
in-place or place justice? If so, would 
such a possibility move attention and 
supportive efforts toward improving the 
places in which people and other living 
beings find themselves, rather than fo-
cusing only on the rights and needs of 
individuals and groups without consid-
eration of their place context? 
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